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REFUTING THE RIGHT
NOT TO KNOW
BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN*
While promising to eventually revolutionize medicine, the capacity to
cheaply and quickly generate an individual’s entire genome has not been
without controversy. Producing information on this scale seems to violate
some of the accepted norms governing the practice of medicine, norms that
evolved during the early years of genetic testing when a targeted paradigm
dominated. One of these widely accepted norms was that an individual had
a right not to know genetic information about him or herself. Prompted by
evolving professional practice guidelines, the right not to know has become
a highly controversial topic. The medical community and bioethicists are
actively engaged in a contentious debate about the extent to which
individual choice should play a role (if at all) in determining which
clinically significant findings are returned.
This paper explores the extent to which it is legally and ethically
necessary to respect the so-called right not to know genetic information
about oneself. Challenging the majority view that the right not to know is
sacrosanct, I push back against that vigorously held (although not always
rigorously defended) position, in defense of the idea that we should
abandon the notion of a strong right not to know. Drawing on the fields of
law, philosophy and social science, I provide an extended argument in
support of a default for returning high value genetic information without
asking about a preference not to know. I conclude by offering some
recommendations about how best to balance individual autonomy and
professional beneficence as the field of genomic medicine continues to
evolve.

Copyright © 2016 by Benjamin E. Berkman.
* Benjamin E. Berkman, J.D., M.P.H., is a faculty member in the Department of Bioethics at the
National Institutes of Health, and is the Deputy Director of the Bioethics Core at the National
Human Genome Research Institute. The author would like to thank his many colleagues who
provided important feedback on early versions of this project, with particular thanks to Zachary
Shapiro for his invaluable research support. The opinions expressed herein are the author’s own
and do not reflect the policies and positions of the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Public
Health Service, or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. This research was
supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Human Genome Research Institute,
National Institutes of Health.

1

2

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 19:1

	
  
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 3
II. EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW CONTROVERSY ............. 9
A. Early Views on the Right Not To Know ................................. 9
B. The Right Not to Know Controversy .................................... 12
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF THE RNTK: AN UNEXPECTEDLY
CONTESTED CONCEPT .................................................................. 22
A. The Arguments for a Strong RNTK ..................................... 23
B. The Arguments Against a Strong RNTK .............................. 25
1. Autonomy Misapplied..................................................... 25
2. The Incoherence Objection ............................................. 29
3. Effects on Third Parties................................................... 31
4. Outdated Examples ......................................................... 32
IV. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT NOT TO
KNOW? ......................................................................................... 35
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment............................... 36
B. Judicial Imposition of Medical Information ......................... 41
1. Mandatory Disclosure of Information to Women
Seeking an Abortion........................................................ 41
2. Court-Ordered Genetic Testing in Toxic Tort Cases ...... 44
3. Duty to Warn Cases ........................................................ 46
V. MOVING AWAY FROM A STRONG RNTK ......................................... 51
A. The Identified Life Effect ..................................................... 51
B. Analyzing the Impact of a Strong RNTK ............................. 54
1. How many people genuinely don’t want to know
genetic information about themselves if it could have a
profound impact on morbidity or mortality?................... 54
2. If people were given genetic risk information that they
would have preferred not to know, what is the
magnitude of the harm they actually experience? ........... 56
a. Psychological harms ................................................. 56
b. Economic harms ....................................................... 60
3. If we actively solicit patient preferences for knowing or
not knowing, how many people undergoing genomic
sequencing would erroneously or accidentally fail to be
notified of potentially lifesaving information? ............... 61
C. Moral Distress ....................................................................... 66
D. Genetic Exceptionalism ........................................................ 68
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 71

BERKMAN PROOF- TO PUBLISHER FINAL.docx

2016]

REFUTING THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW

I.

3

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has seen almost unimaginable advances in genomic
sequencing capabilities.1 In the field’s early days, generation of sequence
data was the primary bottleneck; it took more than a decade and billions of
dollars to produce the first full map of the human genome.2 In the years
since the Human Genome Project was completed, however, the cost and
efficiency of sequencing technology has improved dramatically.3 Massively
parallel sequencing platforms began appearing in 2005, and as this new
technology continued to evolve, the previously unimaginable goal of a
$1000 genome is now nearly obtainable.4 As a result, genomic sequencing
has become a powerful tool for researchers5 and is emerging as an
important component of clinical medicine.6
While promising to eventually revolutionize medicine,7 the capacity to
cheaply and quickly generate an individual’s entire genome has not been
1. See Elaine R. Mardis, A Decade’s Perspective on DNA Sequencing Technology, 470
NATURE 198, 198 (2011) (discussing the advancements in sequencing technology from 2001 to
2011 and analyzing the impacts of these advancements in various fields).
2. Francis S. Collins et al., The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale Biology,
300 SCIENCE 286, 286–89 (2003) (detailing the timeline and cost of sequencing the first human
genome).
3. Mardis, supra note 1, at 198–99, 201.
4. See Kris Wetterstrand, DNA Sequencing Costs: Data from the NHGRI Genome
Sequencing Program (GSP) – Cost Per Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts (including a graph showing the decreasing cost of
genome sequencing since 2001); see also Francis S. Collins & Margaret A. Hamburg, First FDA
Authorization for Next-Generation Sequencer, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2369, 2369 (2013) (“[A]
human genome can be sequenced in about 24 hours for . . . less than $5,000.”); see also W.
Gregory Feero et al., Genomic Medicine — An Updated Primer, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2001,
2008, 2010 (2010) (discussing advances in technology that are driving down the costs of genome
sequencing).
5. See Jamie K. Teer & James C. Mullikin, Exome Sequencing: The Sweet Spot Before
Whole Genomes, 19 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS R145, R147 (2010) (explaining the wide range
of purposes for which genomic sequencing can be used, from “disease causation and diagnosis to
evolutionary comparison of ancient genomes”).
6. See Francis S. Collins, Medical and Societal Consequences of the Human Genome
Project, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 28, 29–31, 33–34, 36 (1999) (discussing potential clinical
applications of human genomic sequencing); see also Teri A. Manolio et al., Implementing
Genomic Medicine in the Clinic: The Future is Here, 15 GENETICS MED. 258, 258, 266 (2013)
(noting that many medical institutions have implemented genomic information into their clinical
care); Katherine Johansen Taber et al., The Promise and Challenges of Next-Generation Genome
Sequencing for Clinical Care, 174 JAMA INTERN. MED. 275, 275–79 (2014) (discussing
examples of how human genomic sequencing information can be applied in a clinical setting).
7. See, e.g., Eric D. Green et al., Charting a Course for Genomic Medicine From Base Pairs
to Bedside, 470 NATURE 204, 204, 205, 207, 209, 211 (2011) (explaining the current and future
impact of genomics on medicine); Editorial, Human Genome at Ten, 464 NATURE 649, 649
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without controversy.8 The problematic characteristic of large-scale genomic
sequencing is the thing that makes it such a powerful tool: the ability to
quickly and cheaply produce massive amounts of genomic information
about an individual. Producing information on this scale seems to violate
some of the accepted norms governing how to practice medicine— norms
that evolved during the early years of genetic testing when a targeted
paradigm dominated. Traditionally, doctors would only order a targeted test
designed to elucidate specific information about a particular medical
problem.9 Similarly, researchers generally only collected the targeted data
necessary to answer their well-defined scientific questions.10 Genetic
counselors focused on conveying the risks and benefits associated with the
testing of a single gene or genes, with the goal of learning more about one
highly penetrant disease.11
Genomic sequencing, in contrast, is not targeted and produces massive
amounts of extraneous information, some of which can have relevance for
an individual’s health.12 This mismatch between the specific indication that
led to ordering the test and the breadth of results that the test produces has
ignited an ongoing debate about the ethics of managing what have become
known as incidental or secondary findings.13 Incidental or secondary
(2010) (mentioning a White House press statement discussing the remarkable scientific advances
and clinical applications that will be afforded by human genome sequencing).
8. See Holly K. Tabor et al., Genomics Really Gets Personal: How Exome and Whole
Genome Sequencing Challenge the Ethical Framework of Human Genetics Research, 155 AM. J.
MED. GENETICS 2916, 2917 (2011) (discussing how genome sequencing has created controversy
by altering the standard ethical framework of researchers); see also Amy L. McGuire et al.,
Research Ethics and the Challenge of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 9 NAT. REV. GENETICS 152,
152, 155 (2008) (discussing ethical controversies created by cost-efficient genome sequencing
technologies).
9. See Isaac S. Kohane et al., The Incidentalome: A Threat to Genomic Medicine, 296 JAMA
212, 212 (2006) (noting that, generally, doctors order tests for specific purposes only if “such tests
will result in a change in [patient] management”).
10. See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research:
Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 219 (2008) (defining “incidental
findings” and explaining that because such findings are only discovered during the course of
conducting research, they are usually outside the scope of the initial research protocol); see also
Erik Parens et al., Incidental Findings in the Era of Whole Genome Sequencing?, 43 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 16, 18 (2013) (explaining that in conducting a search for pathologic variants, genomic
researchers “restrict their analyses to . . . the focus of their study”).
11. Parens, supra note 10, at 16.
12. See Wylie Burke et al., Seeking Genomic Knowledge: The Case for Clinical Restraint, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 1649, 1650 (2013) (discussing how genomic tests “generate unprecedented
amounts of information, much of it extraneous”); see also Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 226
(noting that “approximately 10% of [incidental findings] have . . . potential medical significance
needing further clinical response.”).
13. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 22, 27–28 (Dec. 2013) [hereinafter
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findings are pieces of information (often clinically significant and medically
actionable) that arise from a test or procedure but that are beyond the
original purpose for which the test or procedure was conducted.14 The
problem of incidental or secondary findings has been a major source of
contention in the research ethics and science policy realms for the past
decade.15
Much of this vigorous debate has centered on defining the contours of
the obligation towards patients and research participants whose genomes
are being sequenced. For example, given that researchers and clinicians
have different obligations to participants and patients,16 to what extent is it
required that researchers devote time and resources towards the return of
clinical information unrelated to their scientific aims?17 Is there a duty to
actively interrogate sequencing data to look for incidental findings as the
difficulty of doing so decreases?18 Does an obligation to disclose clinically
relevant information extend to relatives of participants or patients,
particularly after the death of the proband?19 Is there any risk of liability for
failure to disclose clinically relevant incidental findings?20
PCSBI,
ANTICIPATE
AND
COMMUNICATE],
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/
FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.pdf. The President’s Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues draws a useful terminological distinction between incidental and secondary
findings. Incidental findings represent a broad category of information unrelated to the aim of the
test or research. They can be anticipatable (“Practitioner aims to discover A, but learns B, a result
known to be associated with the test or procedure at the time it takes place”) or unanticipatable
(“Practitioner aims to discover A, but learns C, a result not known to be associated with the test or
procedure at the time it takes place”). In contrast, secondary findings represent the narrow
category of unrelated findings that are actively sought (“Practitioner aims to discover A, and also
actively seeks D per expert recommendation”).
14. Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 226. I have adapted my definition from Wolf’s commonly
cited definition of incidental finding: “[A] finding concerning an individual research participant
that has potential health or reproductive importance and is discovered in the course of conducting
research but is beyond the aims of the study.” Wolf’s definition is simultaneously too narrow
(only applying to the research setting) and too broad (accepting an expansive view of what
constitutes an important finding).
15. Leigh Jackson et al., Incidental Findings in Genetic Research and Clinical Diagnostic
Tests: A Systematic Review, 158A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 3159, 3160, 3166 (2012).
16. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV.
RES., THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, 1, 2–3 (1978).
17. Gail P. Jarvik et al., Return of Genomic Results to Research Participants: The Floor, the
Ceiling, and the Choices In Between, 94 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 818, 818–19, 823 (2014).
18. Catherine Gliwa & Benjamin E. Berkman, Do Researchers Have an Obligation to
Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32 (2013).
19. See Ben Chan et al., Genomic Inheritances: Disclosing Individual Research Results From
Whole-Exome Sequencing to Deceased Participants’ Relatives, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1, 6
(2012) (concluding that limited relevant information should be passively disclosed to relatives
unless it is unduly burdensome to the research team).
20. See Elizabeth R. Pike et al., Finding Fault?: Exploring Legal Duties to Return Incidental
Findings in Genomic Research, 102 GEO. L.J. 795, 798–99, 815, 843 (2014) (advocating for a
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While these are all important questions, I wish to bracket them in order
to explore a different and increasingly controversial issue: the extent to
which it is legally and ethically necessary to respect the so-called right not
to know (“RNTK”) genetic information about oneself. As the field of
genetic medicine has emerged over the past few decades, the RNTK has
been a persistent and widely accepted bioethical tenet.21 Simply put, it
involves the idea that an individual should be able to control the genetic
information about themselves to which they are exposed.22 The idea came
to particular prominence in the early research protocols that were looking
for genetic variants predictive of breast cancer.23 In a world where breast
cancer was still fairly stigmatizing, and treatment options were much less
successful, it was certainly understandable why women might want to be
given the opportunity to make a reasoned decision about whether or not to
receive this information.24 Similar arguments were often made about other
devastating conditions, such as Huntington’s disease and Alzheimer’s
disease.25
In a rapidly moving field like medical genetics, the standard of care
will often naturally be in a state of flux. As sequencing capacity has
exploded, and as the breadth and depth of predictive genetic knowledge has
grown, questions about the ongoing appropriateness of a strong RNTK have
emerged. Medical genetics providers and bioethicists have been engaged in
a contentious debate about the extent to which individual choice should
play a role in determining which clinically significant findings are returned.
Autonomy is a core principle of clinical ethics, but the rapid expansion of
sequencing power is challenging conventional wisdom in uncomfortable
ways and is forcing a reexamination of what an appropriate standard of care
looks like in a genomic era. Are traditional conceptions about non-directive
counseling still appropriate? Are there any circumstances where it might be
ethically appropriate to override an individual’s expressed wish not to know

policy requiring researchers to explicitly disclose which of three ethically acceptable approaches
they will employ).
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See Kirke D. Weaver, Genetic Screening and the Right Not To Know, 13 ISSUES L. &
MED. 243, 270 (1997) (defining the RNTK as “the individual decision whether or not to undergo
genetic screening or monitoring”).
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
24. See, e.g., Litanja Lodder et al., Psychological Impact of Receiving a BRCA1/BRCA2 Test
Result, 98 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 15 (2001) (assessing psychological distress in women at risk of
hereditary breast cancer).
25. See, e.g., Ruth Chadwick et al., The Right to Know and the Right Not to Know: The
Emerging Debate, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW: GENETIC PRIVACY
AND RESPONSIBILITY 18 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 2014) (discussing a British woman who
refused predictive testing for Alzheimer’s disease so she could retain hope for the future).
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genetic information about him or herself? How, if at all, should the RNTK
be reflected in informed consent and return of results policies?
To make these questions more concrete, imagine the following
scenario: P is having her genome sequenced as part of a diagnostic work-up
for what is suspected to be a rare genetic disorder. During the informed
consent process, she clearly checks the box opting not to receive any
incidental genetic results. While analyzing P’s genomic data, her physicians
happen to find evidence of high genetic risk for Hereditary Non-Polyposis
Colon Cancer (“HNPCC”). HNPCC is treatable if found early, but is nearly
always fatal if discovered in its late stages. They believe that this
information will prevent serious disease and perhaps even save P’s life
because it would direct her to seek enhanced screening for a cancer that is
very difficult to pick up with normal colonoscopies. Should they disclose
the finding, even though P indicated that she did not want to receive any
secondary findings?
Instincts about whether or not to honor P’s RNTK vary widely,
pointing to the contentiousness of this debate.26 The emerging controversy
about the RNTK highlights two of the classic problems in bioethics. First, it
focuses us on the frequent tension between autonomy and beneficence.27
We place an extremely high value on empowering and honoring an
individual’s choices, particularly in the medical realm.28 On the other hand,
cases like the one outlined above present a clear dilemma for physicians
who want to act in a way that provides the highest prospect of benefit for
their patients. When someone chooses not to know beneficial information
about him or herself, it forces doctors to address an extremely difficult
decision: not honoring a clearly stated choice, or forgoing the opportunity
to take advantage of potentially beneficial medical information.
The RNTK also highlights a second commonly observed problem in
the field of bioethics: the difficulty with rights language. Rights are
generally seen as having “special normative force”29 with the power to
trump other interests.30 But the use of rights language can be criticized
26. See discussion infra Part V.A.
27. See, e.g., David E. Ost, The “Right” Not to Know, 9 J. MED. PHIL. 301, 303–04, 310
(1984) (“The question of refusal of information is an important one in medical ethics because it
brings into direct confrontation two value orientations which are often conflated in ordinary
experience: the humane and the humanistic.”).
28. See id. at 301, 303 (advocating for a right to refuse important medical information). See
also Roberto Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Approach, 30 J. MED.
ETHICS 435, 435–37 (2004) (interpreting the right to not know the results of genetic tests as part
of a patient’s freedom to make choices regarding medical decisions).
29. Leif Wenar, Rights, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 5.1 (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/.
30. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron
ed., 1984).
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because rights are inherently absolute, effectively “inhibit[ing] dialogue that
might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of
common ground.”31 This has the effect of enabling people to pre-emptively
short-circuit discussion, thereby avoiding the necessity of making actual
arguments, and often resulting in a move “toward confrontation instead of
negotiation, as each side escalates an arms race of rights assertions that can
only be resolved by a superior authority like a court.”32
As genomic sequencing technology continues to drive a reexamination of ethical norms and standards of care, there needs to be
serious deliberation about the appropriateness of the RNTK in a genomic
era, given the obvious and inevitable conflict between autonomy and
beneficence that such a right creates. Because the ability to control what
genetic information is revealed has been imbued with the power of a right,
the debate thus far has been unduly focused on the seemingly absolute
nature of an individual’s autonomy.33 The majority view seems to be that
the RNTK continues to be of paramount importance and should not be
abrogated in any way.
A case can be made, however, that genomic medicine is holding too
tightly to an outdated conception of the RNTK. My goal in this article is to
push back against that vigorously held (although not always rigorously
defended) position in defense of the idea that we should abandon the notion
of a strong RNTK. I will provide an extended argument in support of a
default for returning high value genetic information without asking about a
preference not to know. To be clear, I do not intend to argue that there is no
role for patient preferences in determining the kind of genetic information
to be disclosed. Rather, I will be focusing only on the extent to which there
is a RNTK genetic information associated with conditions where medical
action can mitigate or prevent mortality or serious morbidity, and where
there is strong evidence of the link between genotype and significant
disease risk.
In Part II, I will describe the apparent early consensus around the
RNTK, and the subsequent controversy that erupted upon publication of the
American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics Recommendations
for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome
Sequencing. Parts III and IV will dissect and critique the common
arguments made in favor of a RNTK. Part III will explore the foundational
philosophical literature that established the RNTK. In this section, I will
31. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
14 (1991).
32. See Wenar, supra note 29, at §7.2.
33. See Andorno, supra note 28, at 435–37 (arguing that individuals may have a RNTK and
that this right, while not absolute, strengthens autonomy and cannot be assumed).
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argue that the RNTK does not enjoy the overwhelming support that modern
commentators assert. Rather, a detailed analysis of the literature reveals that
the legitimacy and coherence of the RNTK has actually been quite
contested. Furthermore, even the more ardent supporters in this early
literature qualify the right as being quite limited, in that it only applies in
certain contexts and can be overridden with relative ease. Part IV will argue
against a commonly asserted legal claim that the constitutional right to
refuse medical treatment clearly also implies a right not to know medical
information about oneself. Part V will then shift to a series of novel
empirical and normative arguments, drawing on a range of psychological
constructs (i.e., affective forecasting bias, identified victim effect) and areas
of bioethical debate (i.e., moral distress, genetic exceptionalism) to suggest
reasons why we should be skeptical of a strong right RNTK. I conclude by
providing some recommendations about how best to balance individual
autonomy and professional beneficence as the field of genomic medicine
continues to evolve.

II. EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW CONTROVERSY
A. Early Views on the Right Not To Know
Researchers and bioethicists have been grappling with the problem of
genetic incidental findings for over a decade. The National Bioethics
Advisory Commission (“NBAC”) originally examined this issue in 1999,
well before sequencing technology took its monumental leap forward.34
Focusing on the research setting, the NBAC concluded that the default
should be to not return individual research results, except in “exceptional
circumstance[s].”35 Specifically, disclosure was only allowable if “a) the
findings are scientifically valid and confirmed, b) the findings have
significant implications for the subject’s health concerns, and c) a course of
action to ameliorate or treat these concerns is readily available.”36
Once next-generation sequencing technology became available,
sentiment began shifting.37 Still focusing on the use of sequencing in
research settings (since clinical adoption lagged a few years behind),
scholars and researchers started debating whether researchers should have

34. 1 NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE (1999).
35. Id. at 72.
36. Id.
37. Teri A. Manolio, Taking Our Obligations to Research Participants Seriously: Disclosing
Individual Results of Genetic Research, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32, 33 (2006).
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an obligation to disclose incidental findings,38 and later whether there
should be a further positive obligation to search for certain high value
variants.39 While there is still no consensus, the field seems to be moving
towards accepting the view that researchers have some obligation to
disclose incidental findings, although the precise limits of that obligation,
and the circumstances under which it attaches, remain murky.40
Although the incidental findings debate has been protracted and often
quite heated, there was one issue that at least initially seemed
38. See, e.g., Paul Affleck, Is It Ethical to Deny Genetic Research Participants Individualised
Results?, 35 J. MED. ETHICS 209 (2009); Laura M. Beskow, Considering the Nature of Individual
Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 38 (2006); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic
Results in Research Studies: Summary and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140A
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 1033 (2006); Mildred K. Cho, Understanding Incidental Findings in the
Context of Genetics and Genomics, 36 J. L. MED. ETHICS 280 (2008); Ellen Clayton & Lainie
Ross, Implications of Disclosing Individual Results of Clinical Research, 295 JAMA 37 (2006);
Lynn G. Dressler & Eric T. Juengst, Thresholds and Boundaries in the Disclosure of Individual
Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 18 (2006); Conrad V. Fernandez & Charles Weijer,
Obligations in Offering to Disclose Genetic Research Results, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2006);
Morris W. Foster & Richard R. Sharp, Ethical Issues in Medical-Sequencing Research:
Implications of Genotype–Phenotype Studies for Individuals and Populations, 15 HUM. MOL.
GENETICS R45 (2006); Bartha M. Knoppers et al., The Emergence of an Ethical Duty to Disclose
Genetic Research Results: International Perspectives, 14 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1170 (2006);
Fiona A. Miller et al., Duty to Disclose What? Querying the Putative Obligation to Return
Research Results to Participants, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 210 (2008) [hereinafter Miller et al., Duty to
Disclose?]; Franklin G. Miller et al., Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: What Do
Investigators Owe Research Participants?, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 271 (2008); Pilar N. Ossorio,
Letting the Gene Out of the Bottle: A Comment on Returning Individual Research Results to
Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 24 (2006); Vardit Ravitsky & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Disclosing
Individual Genetic Results to Research Participants, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8 (2006); Henry S.
Richardson & Leah Belsky, The Ancillary-Care Responsibilities of Medical Researchers: An
Ethical Framework for Thinking about the Clinical Care that Researchers Owe Their Subjects, 34
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 25 (2004); David I. Shalowitz & Franklin G. Miller, Disclosing
Individual Results of Clinical Research: Implications of Respect for Participants, 294 JAMA 737
(2005); Susan M. Wolf, Introduction, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 216 (2008); Wolf et al., supra note 10.
39. Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 18, at 33.
40. See, e.g., id. (arguing that “opinion seems to be moving toward the idea that there is some
obligation to offer to disclose a limited set of findings, generally understood as findings that meet
an exacting standard of validity, severity, and actionability” but that “[e]ven among those who
support the existence of an obligation to disclose, however, the contours of that obligation remain
murky”); Lisa Eckstein et al., A Framework for Analyzing the Ethics of Disclosing Genetic
Research Findings, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 190, 190 (2014) (“There appears to be an emerging (but
disputed) view that researchers have some obligation to disclose some genetic findings to some
research participants. The contours of this obligation, however, remain unclear.”); Ellen Wright
Clayton & Amy L. McGuire, The Legal Risks of Returning Results of Genomics Research, 14
GENETICS MED. 473, 473–74 (2012) (“There is substantial consensus that people should be
offered results that could trigger interventions that are lifesaving or that could avert serious
adverse health outcomes; there is somewhat less consensus about whether people should be
offered results that may have reproductive implications or that could be personally meaningful.”);
PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 23 (“In fact, there seems to be an
emerging consensus in some contexts that practitioners have a duty to return some incidental
findings—even if there is little consensus as to precisely which ones.”).
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uncontroversial: the right not to know.41 While commentators were arguing
about the circumstances under which there was an obligation to return
individual findings, and which findings to return, there seemed to be broad
support for the view that findings should only be returned when the
research participant desires them.42 To the extent that there was an
obligation on the part of researchers, that obligation was to offer individual
findings to research subjects, which they could then elect to receive or
refuse.43 Accordingly, there was wide agreement that researchers should
discuss the RNTK with potential subjects, and should prospectively solicit
subject preferences.44 Foreshadowing the impending controversy, some
commentators voiced a concern that medical professionals would have
difficulty not returning highly relevant medical information, but the

41. See PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 59 (“The autonomous
patient also has a right not to know selected information and should be able to exercise this right
(to the extent possible).”); see also BIOBANKS FOR RESEARCH, OP. GERMAN NATIONAL ETHICS
COUNCIL 59 (2004) (“Finally, as a precaution, donors would have to be informed in advance of
the possible results, so that they could exercise their right not to know.”).
42. See e.g., Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Genetic
Research Results to Study Participants Updated Guidelines From a National Heart, Lung, and
Blood INST. Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574, 575–76 (2010).
While there was some dissent among the authors of that paper, they ultimately recommended to
honor an individual’s decision not to know genetic information. Id. (“Although the Working
Group was highly supportive of the right of study participants to opt-out of receiving genetic
results, some Working Group members argued there may be exceptional circumstances where . . .
the potential for reducing the harm associated with the finding is so compelling that . . . there is an
ethical basis to override the wishes of the participant . . . . Because of the strong arguments in
favor of respecting research participant choices and the lack of consensus in our group on
overriding the participant’s decision in some circumstances, we recommend that when the
participant has opted-in or opted-out of receiving results, the investigators honor that decision . . .
.”). See also Timothy Caulfield et al., Research Ethics Recommendations for Whole-Genome
Research: Consensus Statement, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 430 (2008) (recommending that the informed
consent process “should acknowledge the participants’ right not to know certain results.”); PCSBI,
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE supra note 13, at 59 (“The autonomous patient also has a right
not to know selected information and should be able to exercise this right (to the extent
possible).”); GERMAN NAT’L ETHICS COUNCIL, BIOBANKS FOR RESEARCH 59 (2004),
http://www.ethikrat.org/files/ner_opinion_biobanks.pdf (“Finally, as a precaution, donors would
have to be informed in advance of the possible results, so that they could exercise their right not to
know.”).
43. See, e.g., Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 231 (“The literature on returning research results
cautions that such results should be offered to research participants, not foisted upon them. This is
consistent with the literature on genetic testing in particular, which recognizes a right not to know
results.”); see also Bartha M. Knoppers, Introduction: From the Right to Know to the Right Not to
Know, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 6, 6 (2014) (“Respect for the autonomy of research participants
recognizes that all individuals have the right to make their own decision.”).
44. See, e.g., Fabsitz et al., supra note 42, at 575 (arguing that incidental findings should only
be offered “during the informed consent process or subsequently, [where] the study participant has
opted to receive his or her individual genetic results.”); Knoppers, supra note 43, at 6.
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prevailing view was that rigorous informed consent could ameliorate this
problem.45
Buttressing this apparent early consensus was a set of international
instruments that increasingly seemed to provide legal recognition for the
RNTK. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights (1997) gave individuals the right “to decide whether or not
to be informed of the results of genetic examination and the resulting
consequences should be respected.”46 Similarly, the European Convention
on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) declared that “the wishes of
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed” because “[p]atients
may have their own reasons for not wishing to know about certain aspects
of their health.”47 Individual countries also passed laws specifically
recognizing an individual’s right not to know diagnostic (genetic)
information.48
B. The Right Not to Know Controversy
These early views on the RNTK were expressed in the nascent days of
genomic medicine, before large-scale genomic sequencing had emerged.49
As sequencing technology advanced, and particularly as it moved from the
research setting into the clinical realm, the debate began to slowly shift
away from the clear consensus view that an individual has a strong RNTK
genetic information about oneself.50 There were two related reasons for this
shift. First, the utility of genomic sequencing was improving.51 An
increasing number of genetic variants had been strongly linked to a range of
phenotypes where knowledge of one’s genetic status could have a profound
45. Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 231 (discussing the fact that “researchers may
understandably be hesitant to accept a research participant’s waiver of information about an IF
likely to be life-threatening or grave and ameliorable, unless the participant appreciates that the
information being waived may be of high health importance.”).
46. Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights, G.A. Res. 31, ¶ 16, 29th
Sess., U.N. DOC. A/RES/ 29/31, at 43 (Oct. 21, 1997).
47. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine:
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, CETS No. 164, 4, 11,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/164.htm.
48. See, e.g., TRI-COUNCIL WORKING GROUP, TRI-COUNCIL POLICY STATEMENT: ETHICAL
CONDUCT
FOR
RESEARCH
INVOLVING
HUMANS
183
(2010),
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2/TCPS_2_FINAL_Web.pdf (“Since the right to privacy
includes a right not to know, researchers shall give participants options for receiving or refusing
different types of information.”).
49. See, e.g., Jarvik et al., supra note 17, at 818 (examining how next-generation sequencing
affects the process of returning results to patients).
50. See, e.g., id.
51. See id. (discussing how the advancements in sequencing technology created a need to
address questions about the RNTK).
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impact on treatments for (or prevention of) serious disease.52 Second, a
growing number of patients were being sequenced,53 leading to reasonable
projections about the important role that genomic sequencing would have as
a regular part of clinical care.54
It was in response to this new reality that the American College of
Medical Genetics and Genomics (“ACMG”) issued their “ACMG
Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome
and Genome Sequencing.”55 Their goal was to start a conversation about
clinical standards for managing the predictable onslaught of medically
relevant incidental findings.56
The Recommendations contained a number of more and less
controversial elements. On the less disputed end, they articulated a
“minimum list” of fifty-seven (later reduced to fifty-six) genes, and a subset
of variants that predispose to twenty-four disorders that “would likely have
medical benefit for the patients and families of patients undergoing clinical
sequencing.”57 Considering both the weight of the scientific evidence and
the clinical implications of knowing the genetic information, they limited
the list to “unequivocally pathogenic mutations in genes where pathogenic
variants lead to disease with very high probability and where evidence
52. See, e.g., Leslie G. Biesecker, Opportunities and Challenges for the Integration of
Massively Parallel Genomic Sequencing into Clinical Practice: Lessons from the ClinSeq Project,
14 GENETICS MED. 393, 395–96 (2012) (considering the clinical practicalities of genomic
sequencing and how it affects the RNTK); Jonathan S. Berg et al., Deploying Whole Genome
Sequencing in Clinical Practice and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge One Bin at a Time, 13
GENETICS MED. 499, 499 (2011) (discussing the impact of new technology for whole genome
sequencing on clinical practice and public health).
53. See Manolio et al., supra note 6, at 259 (articulating how the acceptance of genomic
medicine has caused an increase in participating sites for clinical application).
54. See Green et al., supra note 7, at 209 (“Genomic discoveries will increasingly advance the
science of medicine in the coming decades, as important advances are made in developing
improved diagnostics, more effective therapeutic strategies, an evidence-based approach for
demonstrating clinical efficacy, and better decision-making tools for patient and providers.”); see
also Editorial, The Human Genome at Ten, 464 NATURE 649, 650 (2010) (asserting that genomic
sequencing has been accompanied by unprecedented success in the scientific community that will
have powerful applications to human health in the coming decades).
55. Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in
Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 565, 565–66 (2013) [hereinafter
ACMG Recommendations].
56. Their recommendations were explicitly limited to the clinical context; they intentionally
bracketed genomic sequencing done for research purposes, although there is an ongoing debate
about the influence that clinical recommendations and guidelines should have in the research
realm. See, e.g., Jarvik et al., supra note 17, at 817–19 (recognizing that the ACMG
Recommendations, which specifically address incidental findings in clinical settings, provided
researchers with new considerations in their ongoing debate on reporting genetic results).
57. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 567; see also Anastasia Richardson,
Incidental Findings and Future Testing Methodologies: Potential Application of the ACMG 2013
Recommendations, 28 J.L. BIOSCIENCES 378, 381 (2014).
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strongly supports the benefits of early intervention.”58 While other
researchers and organizations would certainly disagree about the variants
that were and were not included, the Working Group did not intend for this
to be a definitive list.59 Acknowledging the there was insufficient data to
make confident “evidence-based recommendations,” the ACMG working
group used the best available literature and clinical consensus to derive their
product.60 In addressing the limitations of this approach, the committee
explicitly articulated an expectation that this list would actively evolve over
time.61
More controversially, the Working Group recommended that the
laboratory should actively seek the variants on the list.62 This directly
contradicted much of the early incidental findings literature that argued
against the need to actively interrogate genomic data looking for incidental
findings.63 They characterized this approach as “opportunistic screening,”
asserting that even if there was insufficient evidence of cost-effectiveness to
warrant population-level screening for these variants, disclosure is justified
by the fact that a patient has presented him or herself to a physician who is
in a position to provide an important medical benefit.64
Most controversially,65 the Working Group argued against soliciting
patient preferences about receiving (or not receiving) incidental findings.66

58. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 567.
59. Id. See also Laura M. Amendola et al., Actionable Exomic Incidental Findings in 6503
Participants: Challenges of Variant Classification, 25 GENOME RES. 305, 305–06 (2015)
(recognizing limitations of the pathogenic variants identified in the ACMG Recommendations and
finding additional genes associated with medically actionable disorders in individuals with
European and African ancestries).
60. See ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 567.
61. See id. (acknowledging that the ACMG Recommendations are based on clinical
experience from “patients with disease symptoms or family histories” and will likely change as
evidence becomes available from “persons without symptoms or family history”).
62. See id.
63. Gliwa & Berkman, supra note 18, at 33 (“In other words, when researchers generate and
interrogate sequence data, do they have any obligation to actively look within the data for
potential variants associated with severe or life-threatening diseases? The standard view has been
that ‘researchers generally have no obligation to act as clinicians and affirmatively search for IFs,’
but this assumption seems to be relatively unexamined.”) (quoting Wolf et al., supra note 10, at
236)). See also, Cho, supra note 38, at 283 (questioning whether researchers are obliged to sift
through and analyze all collected samples to uncover findings that are unrelated to their research);
Miller et al., Duty to Disclose?, supra note 38, at 212 (suggesting that basing differential
obligations to disclose on the veracity of the genomic data analysis will render unfavorable
outcomes); Brian Van Ness, Genomic Research and Incidental Findings, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS
292, 296 (2008) (arguing against the necessity of a directed effort to find genetic variation
unrelated to the goals of the study).
64. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 572.
65. While not within the scope of this article, it should be noted that the Working Group also
controversially recommended the disclosure of adult-onset conditions to pediatric patients, which

BERKMAN PROOF- TO PUBLISHER FINAL.docx

2016]

REFUTING THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW

15

They did not think that it was appropriate to give patients a choice not to
learn about clinically important and actionable findings, advancing the
claim that clinicians have a fiduciary duty to warn patients about high-risk
variants where an intervention is available.67 They were also concerned that
it would be unduly burdensome to translate the rigorous informed consent
procedures used in targeted genetic testing to the enormous range of results
that genomic sequencing could produce.68 The Working Group contended
that this did not remove a patient’s opportunity to make an autonomous
choice; if patients were uncomfortable with the prospect of learning about
incidental findings, they maintained the right to refuse the test altogether.69
The recommendation against soliciting patient preferences for not
knowing genetic information ignited an extended (and often quite spirited)
debate within the research ethics community.70 A relatively small set of
commentators tried to defend the call for mandatory disclosure of high
value incidental findings.71 The overwhelming majority view, however,
represented a substantial break from the prevailing view, arguing that benefit to parents and other
family members outweighed concerns about protecting the child’s future autonomy. See id. at 568.
66. Id.
67. Id. The ACMG Recommendations do concede that findings would be delivered to the
ordering clinician, who could manage the information in the context of the patient’s specific
circumstances. See id. at 567 (“It was expected that this clinician would contextualize any
incidental findings for the patient in light of personal and family history, physical examination,
and other relevant findings. This places responsibility for managing incidental findings with the
ordering clinician, because we believe that the clinician-patient interaction is the appropriate place
for such information to be explained and discussed.”). While this language could be read to imply
that patient preferences should be sought within the context of the doctor-patient relationship, the
ACMG Recommendations do not make this point explicitly, and the overwhelming weight of the
documents arguments suggest another reading, as will be discussed below.
68. Id. at 568.
69. ACMG Recommendations, supra note 55, at 568 (“Patients have the right to decline
clinical sequencing if they judge the risks of possible discovery of incidental findings to outweigh
the benefits of testing.”).
70. See James P. Evans, Finding Common Ground, 15 GENETICS MED. 852, 852 (2013)
(“[H]aving read (way too many) positions on this matter, listened to strong (but thankfully, largely
polite) debate, and obsessed (way too much) about it.”).
71. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Berkman & Sara Chandros Hull, The “Right Not to Know” in the
Genomic Era: Time to Break From Tradition?, 14 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 29–30 (2014)
(advocating for mandatory disclosure by undermining the RNTK paradigm); Effy Vayena & John
Tasioulas, Genetic Incidental Findings: Autonomy Regained?, 15 GENETICS MED. 868, 868–69
(2013) (proposing mandatory disclosure of incidental findings to provide valuable, life-shaping
and life-saving choices that ultimately enhance the patient’s autonomy); Amy L. McGuire et al.,
Ethics and Genomic Incidental Findings, 340 SCIENCE 1047, 1047–48 (2013) (arguing in favor of
the ACMG Recommendations as they likely promote patient health, contain ethical standards that
actually exceed the legal standards in most states, and afford safeguards for patients deciding
against receiving incidental finding information); Leslie G. Biesecker, Incidental Variants Are
Critical for Genomics, 92 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 648, 648–49 (2013) (claiming that the potential
advances in healthcare posed by reporting incidental findings will not be realized if researchers
are not obligated to identify and return results to patients with life-threatening predispositions to
diseases); James P. Evans, Finding Common Ground, 15 GENETICS MED. 852, 853 (2013)
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was extremely critical of the recommendation, holding that patients have a
strong RNTK, and that any abrogation of that right was inappropriate.72 As
one paper put it, the ACMG statement was “an instance of paternalistic
overreach” that should be “widely rejected as inconsistent with the ethical
and legal duties of clinicians.”73
The arguments against the recommendations generally focused on
patient autonomy, appealing to the long history of shared medical decisionmaking and respect for patient preferences.
For example, as an
impressively credentialed group of bioethicists forcefully argued:
However, choice matters. Patients may wish to decline the
additional analysis on a number of grounds . . . . Concepts of
shared decision making and respect for patient preferences argue
for offering meaningful choices wherever possible, with
appropriate information to allow patients to choose the best
option for themselves . . . . If patients decline additional testing, it
follows that the laboratory should not perform the additional
analyses.74

(advocating for the examination of the fifty-six variants described in the ACMG recommendation
by default, yet expressing discomfort in the illusory degree of autonomy afforded to patients in
allowing them to opt of examination). The arguments advanced in these articles will be examined
in more detail in Part V.
72. See, e.g., Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental
Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854 (2013); Susan M. Wolf et al., Patient
Autonomy and Incidental Findings in Clinical Genomics, 340 SCIENCE 1049 (2013) [hereinafter
Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy]; David S. Rosenblatt, Commentary, Who’s on First in Exome and
Whole Genome Sequencing? Is it the Patient or the Incidental Findings?, 110 MOLECULAR
GENETICS METABOLISM 1 (2013); Lainie F. Ross et al., Mandatory Extended Searches in All
Genome Sequencing: “Incidental Findings,” Patient Autonomy, and Shared Decision Making,
310 JAMA 368 (2013); Megan Allyse & Marsha Michie, Not-So-Incidental Findings: The ACMG
Recommendations on the Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Whole Genome and Whole
Exome Sequencing, 31 TRENDS BIOTECH. 439 (2013); Nat’l Soc’y of Genetic Counselors, NSGC
Responds to ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome
and Genome Sequencing, NSGC.ORG (Mar. 27, 2013), http://nsgc.org/p/bl/et/blogid=
45&blogaid=18; Anne Townsend et al., Paternalism and the ACMG Recommendations on
Genomic Incidental Findings: Patients Seen But Not Heard, 15 GENETICS MED. 751 (2013);
Robert Klitzman et al., Return of Secondary Genomic Findings vs. Patient Autonomy:
Implications for Medical Care, 310 JAMA 369 (2013); Susan M. Wolf, Return of Individual
Research Results and Incidental Findings: Facing the Challenges of Translational Science, 14
ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 557 (2013); Neil A. Holtzman, ACMG
Recommendations on Incidental Findings are Flawed Scientifically and Ethically, 15 GENETICS
MED. 750 (2013); Jarvik et al., supra note 17; Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz et al., Looking for Trouble:
Preventive Genomic Sequencing in the General Population and the Role of Patient Choice, 15
AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2015); Susan B. Trinidad et al., Looking for Trouble and Finding It, 15 AM.
J. BIOETHICS 15 (2015); Annelien L. Bredenoord et al., Next Generation DNA Sequencing:
Always Allow an Opt Out, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28 (2015).
73. Trinidad et al., supra note 72, at 15.
74. Burke et al., supra note 72, at 857.
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The support for this line of reasoning was extensive,75 and critics often
further supported their argument by claiming that there is good reason to
think that many people do not want to learn certain kinds of genetic
information about themselves.76
Even more interesting was the fact that these autonomy-focused views
were often couched in relatively absolute terms.77 Commentators were not
blind to the fact that strongly preferencing the RNTK meant that some
patients might not receive information that could save their lives.78
Although not expressed in exclusively principlistic language, these
arguments essentially seem to advance the view that autonomy should
trump beneficence in RNTK situations. For example, as one commentator
put it: “Patients have the right to refuse testing and findings, even if
potentially lifesaving. Just because many patients might want this
information does not mean that it can or should be imposed on all.”79
Similarly, a number of commentators cited the legal right to refuse medical
75. See Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (“Informed consent is a wellestablished legal requirement designed to protect patient autonomy – not a matter susceptible to
modification by experts in human genetics, no matter how learned.”); Ross et al., supra note 72, at
368 (“Implementing mandatory testing for conditions beyond the scope of the original request is
in conflict with key ethical principles of patient autonomy and shared decision making.”); Allyse
& Michie, supra note 72, at 439 (“[T]he implication that individual autonomy should be overridden by physicians for the patient’s ‘own good’ is weakly supported in modern clinical ethics.”);
Nat’l Soc’y of Genetic Counselors, supra note 72 (“The recently published ACMG
recommendations represent a break from past practices, which prioritized a patient’s right not to
know genetic information that was predictive rather than diagnostic in nature.”); Townsend et. al.,
supra note 72, at 751 (“The traditionally paternalistic model of medicine, underpinned by values
and assumptions about passive patient and authoritative physician roles, is increasingly criticized
by patients, advocacy groups, health policy makers, and many physicians.”); Klitzman et al.,
supra note 72, at 370 (“A balance between beneficence and paternalism would seem to be
optimal, but striking such a fine balance may prove to be difficult.”); Jarvik et al., supra note 17,
at 820 (“Participants should have the right to refuse any results that are offered. Potential research
participants . . . should be provided proper informed consent that respects autonomy, including the
right to refuse participation in research.”).
76. Rosenblatt, supra note 72, at 1 (“In the experience of this physician, it is not common
practise [sic] for the patient or parent to want to know about all health issues unrelated to the
reason they are consulting their health professional.”); Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752 (“In
a qualitative study, we explored patient, public, and professional views of disclosing genomic
incidental findings . . . . They emphasized having ‘the power’ to choose disclosure or not, and that
patients no longer accept medical paternalism.”); Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369
(“Currently, many well-informed individuals with known family histories of cancer syndromes . . .
choose to forgo or defer genetic testing, given that disease manifestations and timing cannot be
predicted.”); Jarvik et al., supra note 17, at 822 (“Participant preferences might play a role in the
choice of which research results should be returned in that all participants might not choose the
same options as those deemed to be clinically significant.”).
77. See Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752.
78. See Burke et al., supra note 72, at 857. See also Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note
72, at 1050 (explaining that allowing patients the right not to know means that they may not
receive potentially lifesaving findings).
79. Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1050.
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interventions, arguing that an individual’s ability to place limits on
treatments also implies a legal right to refuse medical information.80
In addition to the primary autonomy argument, critics of the ACMG
Recommendations discussed a number of other concerns. First, some took
issue with ACMG’s claim that patients still had a choice, namely whether
or not get their genome sequenced.81 Critics worried that it would be
coercive to make clinically indicated genomic sequencing contingent on
agreement to analyze and disclose incidental findings.82 Relatedly, some
raised concerns that this forced choice would cause some patients to forgo
medically necessary sequencing to avoid learning unwanted genetic
information.83
Second, many critics pointed to a variety of ways in which unwanted
genetic information could harm patients.84 Most prominent were

80. See infra Part IV.
81. See Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (explaining that patients had no
opportunity to decline unwanted information because the ACMG makes clinicians “report the
results of the deliberate search for incidental findings to the patient . . . [thus] [t]he patient’s only
choice is to decline sequencing altogether . . . ”); see also Ross et al., supra note 72, at 368
(stating that the ACMG Recommendations violate patient autonomy because they leave patients
with an all-or-nothing decision); Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (explaining how
proponents claim that patients have a choice whether to undergo exome sequencing, while
opponents argue that patients may require testing for diagnosis and treatment of their specified
conditions but may not wish to be tested for other conditions).
82. See Rosenblatt, supra note 72, at 1 (“Were the ACMG guidelines to reach the level of
‘standard of care,’ many clinicians, including myself, would avoid clinical exome sequencing to
spare both my patients and me the added strains of coerced screening.”); Allyse & Michie, supra
note 72, at 440 (“The assertion that ‘patients have the right to decline clinical sequencing if they
judge the risks of possible discovery of incidental findings to outweigh the benefits of testing’
borders on the coercive.”); Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752 (“Another key concern
prompted by the ACMG recommendations is the notion of coercive consent to testing and
disclosure for vulnerable patients desperate to find the cause of a serious disorder.”); Jarvik et al.,
supra note 17, at 822 (“Participation in research studies should be as noncoercive and respectful
of participants as possible . . . . Framing the conversation as ‘if we find . . . would you want’
avoids the potentially coercive ‘we have . . . do you want.’ ”).
83. Burke et al., supra note 72, at 857 (explaining that without the option to refuse additional
findings, patients may refuse genomic testing when it is recommended); Ross et al., supra note 72,
at 368. (“Mandating analysis and reporting beyond that recommended by the ordering clinician
may lead to harm if patients and clinicians decide to avoid testing in order to avoid unwanted
information.”); Townsend et al., supra note 72, at 752 (“Some patients who prefer nondisclosure
may decline whole-genome sequencing even though by doing so they lose the opportunity to end
their diagnostic odyssey.”).
84. See, e.g., Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (recognizing that
unwanted information may harm the patient by causing anxiety as well as unnecessary procedures
and interventions); see also Burke et al., supra note 72, at 858 (noting that the classification of
healthy people as “sick” may cause them to undergo expensive and unnecessary procedures);
Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (identifying children as “at-risk” may harm their
development).
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psychosocial concerns such as stigma, discrimination, and anxiety.85 There
were also worries about the iatrogenic and economic impact of unnecessary
follow-up procedures and interventions, both on the individual and
population levels.86
Finally, critics claimed that there was not adequate evidence to support
the recommendation to engage in opportunistic screening.87 Critics worried
that our knowledge about the link between genotypes and phenotypes is not
yet robust enough to make the specific claims contained in the ACMG
recommendations.88 There were concerns about the prior predictive value
problem; since existing evidence was based on studies involving affected
families, critics argued that it is premature to assume similar penetrance in
families without a history of the disease because there could be as yet
unidentified mitigating genetic features that could reduce or eliminate
risk.89 Invoking the precautionary principle, these critics argued that we
should avoid returning incidental information until we can be more certain
that doing so will help rather than harm patients.90 Finally, critics pointed to
the lack of scientific validity and reliability in existing sequencing
platforms and the resultant risk of false negatives.91
As the academic community was vigorously critiquing the ACMG
recommendations, a growing body of evidence indicated that genetics
professionals shared many of these concerns. In one national survey of
85. See, e.g., Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (arguing that incidental findings will cause
anxiety and stigma in certain communities); Lazaro-Muñoz et al., supra note 72, at 11 (concluding
that incidental findings will increase the chances of genetic discrimination).
86. Burke et al., supra note 72, at 858 (“[C]areful consideration must be given to potential
harms, both to the individual tested and to the health-care system. These harms include adverse
labeling of health people as ‘sick,’ unnecessary health-care expenditures, and iatrogenic
complications.”); Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (“Inflicting unwanted
information on patients carries its own risks, as unwanted information may lead to anxiety, further
clinical workup, and potentially burdensome interventions.”); Ross et al., supra note 72, at 368
(“Mandating analysis and reporting beyond that recommended by the ordering clinician may lead
to harm if patients and clinicians decide to avoid testing in order to avoid unwanted
information.”); Allyse & Michie, supra note 72, at 439–40 (arguing that “extra testing will place
an added burden on laboratories” that could lead to increased costs that might not be covered by
insurance); Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (“Such erroneous classification could cause
anxiety and lead patients to inappropriately seek expensive medical screening . . . or unwarranted
procedures such as prophylactic mastectomy.”);
87. Klitzman et al., supra note 72, at 369 (“Until well-curated human mutation databases are
available, patients may be told about many mutations that, because of incomplete penetrance and
misclassification of benign variants as mutations, are likely neither to cause disease nor confer
substantial risk when ascertained in the general population.”); Holtzman, supra note 72, at 750
(“The evidence to support these beliefs is insufficient to constitute reporting them as ‘the standard
of care.’”).
88. Klitzman, supra note 72, at 369.
89. Holtzman, supra note 72, at 750.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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genetics professionals, 81% of respondents thought that individual patient
preferences should be honored when deciding which results to return.92
Another qualitative study found consensus support for the view that
autonomy and informed consent were of vital importance when returning
results.93 In response to the mounting criticism of their recommendations,
ACMG published a policy statement that clarified their position without
making any substantive changes.94 Eventually, however, ACMG retreated
from their position.95 Citing a “consensus among ACMG members,” the
organization refined their position to state that before the sample is sent for
analysis “patients should have an opportunity to opt out of the analysis of
medically actionable genes when undergoing whole exome or genome
sequencing.”96
It should be noted that in the course of this debate, the President’s
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues published a report on
incidental findings, broadly considering the issue across a range of contexts
(i.e., research, clinical, direct to consumer testing) and technologies (e.g.,
genetics, imaging, etc.).97 While the Commission did not go into extensive
detail about the RNTK, the report did briefly address whether or not there
should be limits on a clinician’s obligation to respect a patient’s preference
not to know genetic information.98 The Commission rightly pointed out that
grappling with incidental findings requires balancing two competing
principles, respect for persons and beneficence.99
Consistent with the majority view, however, there is an emphasis
throughout the document on soliciting and respecting patient preferences
for managing incidental findings, including the RNTK.100 The Commission
did nevertheless seem to leave room to override an autonomous choice.
92. Joon-Ho Yu et al., Attitudes of Genetics Professionals Toward the Return of Incidental
Results from Exome and Whole-Genome Sequencing, 95 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 77, 79 (2014).
93. Megan E. Grove et al., Views of Genetics Health Professionals on the Return of Genomic
Results, 23 J. GENETICS COUNSELING 531, 532–33 (2013).
94. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MEDICAL GENETICS & GENOMICS, Incidental Findings in
Clinical Genomics: A Clarification, 15 GENETICS MED. 664, 664–65 (2013).
95. See ACMG Updates Recommendation on “Opt Out” for Genome Sequencing Return,
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF MEDICAL GENETICS & GENOMICS (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://www.acmg.net/docs/Release_ACMGUpdatesRecommendations_final.pdf.
96. Id.
97. See PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 22.
98. Id. at 59.
99. Id. at 61 (“Beneficence demands that a physician use professional judgment to determine
whether disclosure would do more harm than good for the particular patient, and respect for
persons requires that a patient’s preferences be ascertained, preferably before testing.”).
100. PCSBI, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 13, at 4, 5, 10, 30, 44, 59, 61, 63, 64,
66, 78, 83 (2013) (recognizing the importance of patient autonomy and consistently asserting that
respect for persons requires that the autonomous individual should be encouraged to express
preferences regarding secondary and incidental findings before testing).
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Specifically, the Commission recommended that “clinicians should respect
a patient’s preference not to know about incidental or secondary findings to
the extent consistent with the clinician’s fiduciary duty.”101 Similarly, they
assert that “if patients wish to opt out of receiving incidental or secondary
findings that are clinically significant, actionable, and of serious importance
to their health, then clinicians should exercise discretion.”102
Overall, while the Commission’s position on the RNTK seems to be
much less strident than many of the other commentators in the
contemporaneous literature, they also did not firmly defend the ACMG
view. While representing a step away from the majority view, the
Commission did not challenge the underlying appropriateness of the RNTK
in a genomic era, given the obvious and inevitable conflict between
autonomy and beneficence that such a right creates. Nor do they rigorously
explore when and why it might be acceptable to override a patient’s RNTK,
and whether it would be appropriate to abandon the consensus position that
preferences have to be proactively solicited. I take up these challenges in
the subsequent sections.103

101. Id. at 64.
102. Id.
103. See infra Parts III, IV, V.
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III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF THE RNTK: AN UNEXPECTEDLY
CONTESTED CONCEPT
The RNTK genetic information is a relatively new idea, first appearing
in the literature in the 1970s and 80s104 but not really gaining traction until
the 1990s.105 A substantial body of work developed in the subsequent
decade, concurrent with the gradual incorporation of genetic testing into
clinical medicine.106 While there appears to be significant recent support
for the RNTK, a robust examination of the concept must begin with an
analysis of the idea’s philosophical origins. Contemporary RNTK advocates
have had a tendency to present their views in the absence of this historical
perspective, seemingly arguing that a strong, autonomy-based RNTK is
self-evident.107 In contrast to this assumption, I believe that a close
examination of the earlier RNTK literature reveals a much more
controverted and nuanced history.108 Specifically, I will demonstrate that
acceptance of a strict RNTK is far from universal in the philosophical
104. Robert M. Veatch, Three Theories of Informed Consent: Philosophical Foundations and
Policy Implications, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, APPENDIX II 6, 8–9, 50 (Nat’l Comm’n for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical & Behavioral Research ed., 1978); Ost, supra note
27.
105. See, e.g., Torleiv Austad, The Right Not to Know–Worthy of Preservation Any Longer?
An Ethical Perspective, 50 CLIN. GENETICS 85, 86 (1996) (explaining that the RNTK gained
significant traction in the 1990s after studies found that the burden of genetic information had the
potential to cause serious psychological harm); see Juha Räikkä, Freedom and a Right (Not) to
Know, 12 BIOETHICS 49, 50 (1998) (analyzing the relationship between the moral right to know
and the RNTK genetic information to prevent “harmful personal consequences”); Weaver, supra
note 22, at 243 (1997); Rosamond Rhodes, Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights
and Responsibilities in the Face of Genetic Knowledge, 23 J. MED. PHIL. 10, 11 (1998)
(examining the moral responsibilities and effects that exercise of the RNTK has on third parties);
Graeme Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance: Genetic Information and the Right not to Know, 6 EUR.
J. HEALTH L. 119, 130 (1999) [hereinafter Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance] (concluding that the
field of bioethics is witnessing a new era which expressly recognizes an interest in not knowing
genetic information); Graeme Laurie, Protecting and Promoting Privacy in an Uncertain World:
Further Defences of Ignorance and the Right Not to Know, 7 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 185, 188 (2000)
[hereinafter Laurie, Privacy in an Uncertain World] (arguing that the RNTK can be circumvented
by medical practitioners, either internationally, or unintentionally, by disclosing information
before an individual unequivocally elects to exercise this right); Tuija Takala, The Right to
Genetic Ignorance Confirmed, 13 BIOETHICS 288, 289 (1999) (examining the psychological
benefits of genetic ignorance, and the harm it can have on others).
106. See Chadwick et al., supra note 25, at 13, 19 (explaining that since 1997, the emergence
of genetic testing in clinical medicine greatly contributed to the developments in RNTK); see also
Rhodes, supra note 105, at 11 (analyzing the responsibilities and rights of individuals with respect
to the emergence of genetic testing and genetic knowledge).
107. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435.
108. In this section, I will exclusively be analyzing the earlier RNTK literature, drawing a line
at 2007, around the advent of next-generation sequencing. This new technology is ethically
relevant because it changed the magnitude and likelihood of concerns that before that point had
been primarily theoretical. See Tabor et al., supra note 8, at 2917.
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literature, and that even staunch proponents recognize that the RNTK can
be easily overridden by competing considerations.
A. The Arguments for a Strong RNTK
Most commonly, scholars ground the RNTK in autonomy, arguing that
one’s right to self-determination implies a right to make decisions about
learning (or not learning) sensitive medical information.109 These authors
typically build their argument on a foundational assertion that genetic
information has the potential to cause psychological and economic harm.110
While often granting that more information can allow for improved
decision-making regarding future plans, they stress that for some
individuals, this information can lead to anxiety, depression, stigma and
even discrimination.111 Therefore, an individual should be afforded the
freedom to weigh the risk of psychosocial and economic harms against the
potential benefit that the knowledge might provide.112
Beyond this basic argument, RNTK proponents often focus their
reasoning on a number of specific themes. Most commonly, a number of
scholars cite concerns about paternalism in medical care, making claims it
has no place in modern medicine, even if justified by seemingly reasonable
considerations.113 For example, Tuija Takala argues that:

109. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (2004) (“This paper argues that ‘autonomy,’
understood in a wide sense, provides a theoretical basis for a right not to know one’s genetic
status.”); Jonathan Herring & Charles Foster, “Please Don’t Tell Me”, 21 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 20, 28 (2012) (finding that although the RNTK enhances personal
autonomy, the right is not absolute because “it can and sometimes should be outweighed by other
considerations”); Austad, supra note 105, at 86 (denoting that the RNTK has been predominately
motivated by the severe psychological consequences that can arise from an individual’s cognition
of their genetic abnormalities); Weaver, supra note 22, at 270, 273 (explaining that the RNTK
ensures an individual has complete autonomy in their decision regarding the disclosure of their
genetic information); Takala, supra note 105, at 292 (reasoning that a truly autonomous decision
“implies a duty of self-determination,” and that an individual must consider all of the relevant
information regarding the disclosure of the genetic defect).
110. See Austad, supra note 105, at 86 (“There is reason to believe that increasing knowledge
about genetic predispositions could be an extra burden, at least for some.”); see also Weaver,
supra note 22, at 243 (“[S]uch knowledge can lead to anxious preoccupation with the ever present
disease potential within, and discrimination by employers, insurers, governmental agencies, and
health care providers without.”); see also Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (“[O]ne has to consider
that the burden of knowledge may become unbearable for them, leading to a severe psychological
depression and having a negative impact on their family life and on their social relationships in
general.”).
111. See Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (noting that the burden of knowledge that coalesces
with the acquiring of genetic information can lead to negative psychological consequences).
112. Id. at 437.
113. See, e.g., Tuija Takala, Genetic Ignorance and Reasonable Paternalism, 22 THEORETICAL
MED. BIOETHICS 485, 490 (2001).
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If a person’s own judgment can be overridden by considerations
of the “reasonable,” as defined by the profession, or by ethicists
for that matter, we must forget the principle of autonomy at the
outset, or at least find its applications extremely limited. It seems
that by accepting the rhetorics of “what the reasonable person
would do,” we re-introduce the practice of paternalism to medical
ethics.114
Takala clearly dismisses the idea of requiring a person to obtain
knowledge that can be used to benefit him or herself, labeling such a
practice as “reasonable paternalism.”115 She draws a distinction between
preventing harm and creating benefit, arguing that knowing one’s genetic
status offers the possibility of a benefit, but not knowing about a genetic
defect does not directly harm the person, since the defect is present
regardless.116 If forced provision of information poses a risk of harm, and
there is only a possibility of creating benefit (rather than prevention of
harm) unwanted provision of genetic information is indefensibly
paternalistic.117 According to her view, it is paternalistic to overrule
individual choice, even if a choice differs from our conception of what is
“reasonable.”118 This paternalism may be understandable, but that does not
make it acceptable.119
Roberto Andorno also argues that individuals may have a legitimate
interest in not knowing their genetic makeup in order to avoid serious
psychological consequences.120 Not only does he endorse the commonsense
view that it is respectful of autonomy to comply with an individual’s stated
preference, he goes further to say that honoring the RNTK should be seen
as an enhancement of an individual’s autonomy “because the decision to
know or not to know is not taken out of the hands of the patient by the
doctor.”121 Furthermore, he makes a non-maleficence argument, claiming
that if the information is likely to cause psychological harm, the medical

114. Id.
115. Id. at 490 (explaining that “reasonable paternalism” essentially disregards individual
autonomy for a more objective standard that looks solely to “what a reasonable person would do”
in similar circumstances).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Takala, supra note 113, at 490 (finding that individual autonomy should be insulated from
societal judgment and paternalistic limitations guided by the objectivity of “what a reasonable
person would do”).
119. Takala, supra note 105, at 288 (arguing that “liberal societies should acknowledge
people’s right to remain in ignorance” unless “grave harm would follow if people were allowed to
make these self-regarding decisions”).
120. Andorno, supra note 28, at 435–37.
121. Id. at 436.
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principle of primum non nocere (do no harm) justifies honoring the
RNTK.122
Others make an argument based on scientific uncertainty, pointing out
that genetic information is often less probative than people realize.123
Indeed, there are many conditions where genetics simply reveal a risk
factor, rather than anything of diagnostic certainty.124 In some cases “since
being a carrier is not something that can be averted by informing, it is not
clear why there should be an onus on individuals to know, or to facilitate
others being told, about their genetic constitution.”125 These authors also
highlight how reproductive issues give genetic information a unique
valence, as genetic knowledge may present a constraint on autonomous
reproductive choices if people change their decisions due to the genetic
information.126
Interestingly, there does not seem to be overwhelming support in the
foundational RNTK literature for a strict, autonomy-based RNTK.127 The
limited number of scholars discussed above support such a view, but the
weight of the literature is squarely against an expansive view of the RNTK.
As I will discuss in the next few sections, most scholars either argue for a
much narrower conception of the RNTK, or dismiss the idea entirely.
B. The Arguments Against a Strong RNTK
1. Autonomy Misapplied
There are a number of lines of reasoning challenging the notion of a
strong, autonomy-based RNTK. One main strain of criticism asserts that the
concept of an autonomy-based RNTK is too broad and that the principle has
been misapplied.128 As Rhodes has argued, “Misunderstandings about the
nature and moral force of autonomy have led some in the genetics

122. Id. at 437.
123. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 22, at 252 (“Because of the varied causal nature of many
‘genetic’ diseases or conditions, it seems highly unlikely that any one test or series of tests would
be able to incorporate the numerous factors that influence the development of the illness.”).
124. See id. at 251–52.
125. Jane Wilson, To Know or Not to Know? Genetic Ignorance, Autonomy and Paternalism,
19 BIOETHICS 492, 502 (2005).
126. See id. at 498; supra Part III.A.
127. I’m defining the foundational literature as the articles published prior to the emergence of
genomic sequencing technology in approximately 2007. Compare Andorno, supra note 28, at 435
(arguing that the RNTK genetic information is deeply grounded in the theoretical concept of
autonomy); with Laurie, Privacy in an Uncertain World, supra note 105, at 190 (advocating that
the foundational basis for the RNTK is grounded in privacy as opposed to autonomy).
128. See Wilson, supra note 125, at 502.
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community to a false conclusion about genetic ignorance.”129 The concern
with an autonomy-based RNTK stems from the commonly held view that
rights are “pre-emptive and value-laden” and therefore the content of a right
must be carefully articulated and defended.130
On Laurie’s account, autonomy fails as a basis for doing so for a
number of reasons.131 First, a strong, autonomy-based RNTK is
inappropriate because that line of reasoning unrealistically requires ignoring
the fact that there is no such thing as an unfettered choice.132 There are lots
of things that people would like to do (or not do), or to know (or not know),
but one sometimes must make non-ideal choices. Second, there is no basis
for the idea that information alone is autonomy-constraining, because a
clear distinction can be drawn between obtaining relevant information and
making subsequent decisions on the basis of that information.133 Finally,
autonomy is not boundless; there are certain actions that are prohibited as a
matter of public policy, like suicide or selling oneself into slavery.134
Instead of autonomy, Laurie argues in favor of a RNTK grounded in
privacy.135 Distinguishing his reasoning from the more common autonomy
claims, he states that the RNTK is “better characterized as a privacy issue
that is related to, and yet distinct from, autonomy claims that we each might
have as individuals worthy of respect.”136 He prefers the principle of
privacy because it provides a “neutral basis from which arguments about
the merits and demerits of non-disclosure can be advanced and
assessed.”137 He builds his theory on the idea of spatial privacy, or the
notion that we have a right to ensure that an individual is in “in a state of
non-access.”138 Spatial privacy includes both the familiar notion of physical
separateness, but also “encompasses separateness of the individual’s
psyche.”139 The latter form of privacy entitles an individual to protect his or
129. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 26. See also Matti Häyry & Tuija Takala, Genetic Information,
Rights, and Autonomy, 22 THEORETICAL MED. BIOETHICS 403, 403 (2001).
130. See Graeme Laurie, Recognizing the Right Not to Know: Conceptual, Professional, and
Legal Implications, 42 J.L. MED. ETHICS 53, 56 (2014) (rejecting the characterization of nonknowledge as a “right”).
131. See id. at 55–56.
132. See id. at 56 (“no choice in life is unfettered by circumstantial influence . . . ”); see also
John Harris & Kirsty Keywood, Ignorance, Information and Autonomy, 22 THEORETICAL MED.
BIOETHICS 415, 418 (2001) (stating that all choices have an effect on autonomy to some extent).
133. Laurie, supra note 130, at 56.
134. Harris & Keywood, supra note 132, at 420.
135. Laurie, supra note 130, at 53.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 56.
138. See Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance, supra note 105, at 119 (explaining that this right is
violated when one’s physical sphere is invaded).
139. Id.
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her own sense of self.140 As a result, it can be an invasion of one’s
“psychological spatial privacy” to receive information about oneself that
was not already possessed.141
Ultimately, in basing his conception of a RNTK in privacy rather than
autonomy, he calls into question the view that the RNTK is actually a
strong right.142 Rather, he acknowledges that a decision to violate
someone’s psychological privacy involves a number of competing factors
and must be holistically assessed instead of being held up as a strict ethical
rule.143 Using a privacy lens, Laurie demonstrates that an unwanted
disclosure can be a violation, as it represents an incursion into the private
sphere.144 But even if disclosure constitutes a violation of privacy, it can be
justifiable under certain circumstances.145 Ultimately, he argues for a prima
facie presumption in favor of non-violation of the sphere of privacy.146 This
presumption can be rebutted, however, in a range of clinical cases.147 When
considering the justifiability of violating someone’s psychological integrity,
a number of factors should be relevant, including: availability of a cure or
intervention, severity of the condition, and the likelihood of disease
manifestation.148
Wilson, like Laurie, is a RNTK proponent who does not see autonomy
as the correct supporting principle.149 She acknowledges that it is possible
to view the provision of genetic information as an attack on autonomy,
particularly when such information “impinges on the range of choices that
an individual has to make, and on the conditions of autonomy required to
make them.”150 However, she thinks that a RNTK should exist in a much
more limited form than an autonomy-based view would require.151 While
she concedes that there should be a RNTK in certain obvious circumstances
140. Id.
141. See id. at 119–20.
142. See id. at 123–24, 127, 129 (suggesting that autonomy cannot explain the RNTK because
there is simply no way to exercise the choice of not knowing, while privacy, on the other hand,
suggests the idea that individuals can be protected from unwarranted information about
themselves).
143. Id. at 127
144. See Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance, supra note 105, at 124 (explaining that sharing
unwanted information diminishes the amount of control that one has over their own private
sphere, as it coerces an individual into self-reflection and re-evaluation).
145. See id. at 121 (arguing that in order for an action to be justifiable, there must be a high
likelihood that the harm will be avoided by the revelation of the information).
146. Id. at 127.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 127–28.
149. Wilson, supra note 125, at 503–04.
150. Id. at 502.
151. See id. at 503–04 (arguing that greater consideration should be given to potential harms
and benefits to welfare).
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(such as when there is nothing that can be done with the information, or
there is clear evidence of psychological harm that will result) her primary
claim is that an autonomy-based RNTK is unjustifiably broad, and that we
should only be talking about a narrow RNTK in limited situations when it
can be justified by a clear demonstration that welfare costs to an individual
outweigh associated benefits.152
Räikkä similarly explores whether autonomy is the correct theoretical
grounding for a RNTK, arguing that while self-determination can
technically support a RNTK to know, such a position relies on a number of
problematic assumptions.153 In particular, he is concerned about our ability
to determine when people are making competent, authentic decisions and
whether one can ever make a solely self-regarding choice to refuse genetic
information.154 Given the controversies inherent in asserting an autonomybased RNTK, he worries about its persuasive rigor when appealed to in
concrete cases where the RNTK is in question.155 He argues that when:
there are disagreements about whether a person has a right to
know or a right not to know, it may be unhelpful to refer to a
right to personal determination. To argue for example that a
person has a right not to have information concerning her own
genes, since she has a moral right to self-determination, is
nowhere near enough to convince and give a rational warrant to
believe she has such a right.156
Ultimately, he concludes that proponents of controversial claims, like the
RNTK, should avoid appealing to autonomy and instead find “values that
allow for a shorter, less controversial route to shedding light on the
problem.”157
Given the views of scholars like Laurie, Wilson, and Räikkä, there is
clearly a school of thought comprised of people who generally accept a
form of the RNTK, but who reject a broad, autonomy-based view.
Interestingly, these scholars are clear that we should anticipate the
circumstances where the RNTK can be overridden.158 For example, Laurie
152. Id. at 499–500, 502–04 (arguing for an alternative to an autonomy-based RNTK, which
considers harms and values to welfare, and whether disclosure of the information will be useful in
light of the specifics of the genetic disease).
153. Räikkä, supra note 105, at 61, 62.
154. Id. at 62.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 63.
158. See, e.g., Herring & Foster, supra note 109, at 28. (“We do not say that this is or should
be an absolute right. We accept that, like most other recognized rights, it can and sometimes
should be outweighed by other considerations.”); Räikkä, supra note 105, at 57 (“If a person has a
weak right to self-determination, there are cases in which it is justified to override the right to selfdetermination . . . . In a given situation we should always first consider the circumstances and only
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argues that the RNTK should be balanced against a number of clinical
considerations, including the availability of a treatment for a severe disease
that is likely to manifest.159 Herring and Foster agree that there should be
exceptions to any RNTK, presenting criteria similar to those endorsed by
Laurie.160 These exceptions echo the idea that I will defend in more detail
in the sections below, namely that we should reject a RNTK that is so broad
as to include conditions where medical action can mitigate or prevent
mortality or serious morbidity, and where there is strong evidence of the
link between genotype and significant disease risk.
2. The Incoherence Objection
In addition to challenging the notion that the principle of autonomy
plausibly supports a RNTK, some critics make an even more forceful
argument, calling into question the very coherence of the RNTK as a viable
concept. These scholars make an autonomy claim of their own, but in the
opposite direction, advancing the idea that knowledge is necessary in order
to exercise autonomy.161 One needs to know that there is a question in order
to make a decision; so not knowing undermines one’s ability to make an

then decide whether a right to self-determination should be respected.”); Andorno, supra note 28,
at 437 (arguing that it is appropriate to consider overriding the RNTK if there is serious risk to
other individuals; if there are reasonable and effective treatments/cures for the condition being
tested for; or for broader public health reasons).
159. Laurie, supra note 130, at 59 (listing a number of other relevant considerations: “The
availability of a cure or effective intervention; the severity of the condition and likelihood of
onset; the nature of the health condition itself, e.g., genetic or otherwise; the nature of any further
testing or intervention that might be required; the nature of the information to be disclosed; the
nature of the request (e.g., testing for an individual’s health or for diagnostic purposes for a
relative); the question of whether and how far disclosure can further a legitimate public interest,
which can include familial interests; and the question of how the individual might react if offered
unsolicited information (e.g., whether any advance decision has been made and is applicable in the
circumstances).”).
160. Herring & Foster, supra note 109, at 27 (listing: “The availability of cures or preventive
measures[;]The severity of the disease and likelihood of onset; The nature of the disorder[;] The
availability of genetic testing and its accuracy in assessing the risk[;] The relative’s likely
emotional reaction when given the information[;] The effect any decision (to disclose or not to
disclose) will have on the familial relationship and on the dynamics of the particular family.”).
161. See, e.g., Phillipa Malpas, The Right to Remain in Ignorance About Genetic Information–
Can Such a Right Be Defended in the Name of Autonomy?, 118 N. ZEALAND MED. J. 71, 72
(2005) (“Respecting self-determination requires that individuals have access to information so that
they can make informed decisions.”); Laurie, supra note 130, at 55 (“[I]n order for us to choose
meaningfully, we must be informed about the parameters within which we are being invited to
exercise choice. The entire consent mechanism is constructed around informed choice.”); Rhodes,
supra note 105, at 17 (“[R]espect for autonomy actually leads to the opposite conclusion, the
obligation to pursue genetic knowledge.”).
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autonomous choice.162 Rather, autonomy demands “critical reflection,”
which includes thoughtful, informed decision-making, and deliberation.163
This is made impossible if one deprives one’s self of information.164
Without relevant information, it is impossible to make informed decisions
about future plans, and ill-informed decisions may even frustrate one’s
future self, as an individual may make choices that are ultimately selfdefeating.165 As one scholar argued, a refusal of relevant knowledge is so
irrational as to be “directly opposed to human rights philosophy and to
ethics.”166
Some have gone as far as saying that autonomy requires rationality,
and freedom of will, but patients who deny themselves readily available
information are not acting rationally, as they are depriving themselves of
relevant health information.167 If someone is so fixed in their intentions that
no amount of relevant information would change their mind, this would be
tantamount to an irrational obsession.168 Similarly, it is logically impossible
for someone to claim to know a priori that information will not be relevant
to his or her decision.169
This line of reasoning not only rejects a RNTK, but also seems to
imply a moral duty to be informed about information that would make a
difference in decisions (at least when it can be obtained without undue
effort).170 For example, Rhodes argues that the concept of autonomy may
actually create a duty to know, as people cannot make autonomous choices
without relevant information.171 Therefore, rather than respecting
autonomy, the RNTK allows willful blindness that stymies autonomous
decision-making.172 This duty to know is activated when “genetic

162. See, e.g., Veatch, supra note 104, at 26–33 (“If the human is ethically responsible for
decisions about his or her own medical future, it can be seriously questioned at the ethical level
whether one is justified in waiving information necessary to make a consent informed.”).
163. Malpas, supra note 161, at 75 (“When autonomy (as self-determination) is understood as
involving critical self-reflection, deliberation, and thoughtful and informed decision-making, it
becomes clear that one must have relevant information at ones [sic] disposal to be autonomous.”).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Gilbert Hottois, A Philosophical and Critical Analysis of the European Convention of
Bioethics, 25 J. MED. & PHILOS. 133, 140 (2000).
167. Ost, supra note 27, at 306.
168. Id.
169. Id. (“But to claim to know what you cannot know is contradictory, i.e., irrational.”)
170. Id. at 309 (“[W]e can say that the right of informed consent is a mandatory right, and that
receiving information about one’s diagnosis, alternative treatments, etc., is both a right and a
duty.”). See also Rhodes, supra note 105, at 18.
171. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 18.
172. Harris & Keywood, supra note 132, at 418 (2001) (arguing that the right not to know is
“inimical to liberty rights”).
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information is likely to make a significant difference in my decisions and
when the relevant information is obtainable with reasonable effort.”173
If there is no such thing as a right to remain ignorant of true genetic
information about oneself, the RNTK must compete on equal terms with
others’ rights. Harris and Keywood propose two rights in particular, that
might reasonably defeat a desire to remain in ignorance.174 First, they
present an argument for the right of free speech, particularly in the context
of doctors exercising their free speech right to warn patients about medical
risks, and to provide patients with a fully informed understanding of their
health conditions.175 Second, they argue for the right to decline to accept
responsibility for others’ decisions; doctors should not be forced to make
certain decisions for patients who are willfully ignorant of their true health
status.176 I will explore these and other possible relevant considerations in
Section V below.
3. Effects on Third Parties
A third objection to a strict, autonomy-based RNTK is founded on a
concern about the effect of maintaining one’s ignorance on others. On this
line of reasoning, genetic information unavoidably involves relatives, and
one has an obligation to learn readily available information about your
health in order to allow relatives to have an opportunity to act on that
knowledge.177 Relatives that hadn’t previously known about a familial
genetic risk would be able to benefit from knowing by taking a variety of
actions, such as seeking their own genetic testing, changing risk-associated
behaviors, pursuing prophylactic treatment options, engaging in rigorous
screening, etc.178
Austad articulates this kind of view clearly, arguing that the RNTK
does not actually rise to the level of a human right because genetic
information does not only implicate a single individual.179 Rather, genetic
information, and information about genetic risks, implicates the individual,
their family members, their practicing physician, and, potentially, scientific
research into genetics in general.180 An individual’s desire to say no to
genetic information may conflict with the duty of care (i.e., duty to warn) a
173. Rhodes, supra note 105, at 18.
174. Harris and Keywood, supra note 132, at 418.
175. Id. at 431.
176. Id. at 431–32.
177. See Austad, supra note 105, at 87.
178. See, e.g., id.; Maria C. Bottis, Comment on a View Favoring Ignorance of Genetic
Information: Confidentiality, Autonomy, Beneficence and the Right Not to Know, 7 EUR. J.
HEALTH L. 173, 174, 179–80 (2000).
179. Austad, supra note 105, at 87.
180. Id.
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potentially affected family member.181 This does not mean that the RNTK
should not be respected if possible, but that there are clear situations where
other competing ethical principles might cause one to disregard a desired
RNTK.182 On this view, the RNTK should not be viewed as a strict right183
and when there is a conflict between the RNTK and the right of relatives to
sensitive genetic information concerning their own health, the RNTK must
yield, due to the very real risk of harm to the family members.184 Andorno
advances a similar, but somewhat weaker claim, calling the RNTK a
“relative right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to the
individual is necessary in order to avoid serious harm to third parties,
especially family members.”185
4. Outdated Examples
Thus far, I have shown that the foundational RNTK literature
substantially challenges the notion of a strong, autonomy-based right. Even
if one finds the critiques presented above to be unconvincing, there is an
additional, novel argument to be made against those asserting a strong
RNTK. Specifically, the examples used by scholars to support a RNTK are
extremely limited and, I would argue, have not kept pace with evolution of
genomic technologies. A close reading of the literature demonstrates an
almost exclusive reliance on three primary examples: Huntington’s disease
(“HD”), Alzheimer’s disease (“AD”), and breast cancer (“BRCA”). 186
Starting with HD and AD, defenders of RNTK often point to concerns
about testing for these two conditions, citing data on people’s reluctance to
get tested.187 Similarly, the illustrative cases are typically about one of

181. Id. (“If somebody objects to being informed and prevents relatives from being informed,
this person is rejecting his/her duty to inform those who may really want this information and may
also need it.”)
182. See id. (noting conflicts between individuals who may not want to know and relatives
who would prefer to have that information).
183. Id. at 88 (“[T]he right not to know is not to be considered as an absolute ethical principle,
especially when dealing with very sensitive genetic information.”)
184. Id. (“If somebody objects to being informed and prevents relatives from being informed,
this person is rejecting his/her duty to inform those who may really want this information and may
also need it.”)
185. Andorno, supra note 28, at 439.
186. See e.g., id., at 435; Bredenoord, supra note 72, at 29.
187. See, e.g., Tarja-Brita Robins Wahlin, To Know or Not to Know: A Review of Behavioral
and Suicidal Ideation in Pre-Clinical Huntington’s Disease, 65 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING
279, 281–82 (2007) (noting that several recent studies indicated that 3 to 21 percent of at-risk
persons enter predictive testing programs; a vast majority feared the negative consequences of a
potential positive result).
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these three examples.188 RNTK proponents cite these kinds of studies and
cases to illustrate the potential anxiety that people feel when faced with
negative genetic information, and to support the claim that there is a very
real risk of harm associated with unwanted provision of one’s genetic
status.189
But both examples come out of the targeted genetics era, and I would
argue that they have limited utility as valid comparators in the modern
genomic era. HD and AD are devastating and presently immitigable
neurological conditions.190 As such they are sui generis, since they present
the possibility of psychological harm without any corresponding clinical
benefit.191
When these kinds of examples are utilized by scholars, they should
only be used to make a claim about the RNTK genetic information
associated with commensurate diseases. But this isn’t the case;
commentators consistently use these limited examples to make broader
claims. For example, Andorno appropriately starts by arguing that “for
many people, the discovery that they have a genetic condition that places
them at a high risk of suffering certain untreatable diseases could so
depress them that the quality, joy, and purpose of their lives would literally
evaporate” (emphasis added).192 But this qualification that the RNTK only
applies in this subset of conditions falls away thereafter and most other
authors don’t even follow Andorno’s initial token wave at this important
limitation.193
The field of genomic medicine has moved beyond these two limited
examples; the current iteration of the RNTK debate should really be about
whether individuals have the right to refuse information regarding
conditions where medical action can mitigate or prevent mortality or
188. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (citing examples of individuals with a genetic
predisposition to Alzheimer’s and breast cancer); Bredenoord et al., supra note 72, at 29
(providing research on breast cancer testing in at-risk patients).
189. See, e.g., Andorno, supra note 28, at 435 (presenting examples of situations where at-risk
patients reject genetic testing for fear of negative consequences); Bredenoord et al., supra note 72,
at 29 (noting that a high percentage of people refuse genetic testing to avoid psychological harm);
Austad, supra note 105, at 86 (stating that the RNTK is motivated by the psychological pressures
that individuals may face).
190. See Wahlin, supra note 187, at 279 (“HD is an autosomal dominant neurodegenerative
disorder characterized by irreversible physical and mental deterioration, personality change, and
increased susceptibility to mental disorder.”); What is Alzheimer’s?, ALZ.ORG,
http://www.alz.org/alzheimers_disease_what_is_alzheimers.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2015)
(noting that AD is the sixth-leading cause of death in the United States and has no cure).
191. See Wahlin, supra note 187, at 280 (noting that because there is no cure or adequate
treatment for HD, there may be no legitimate benefit in predictive testing; instead, the
psychological risk associated may result in injury to the patient).
192. Andorno, supra note 28, at 435.
193. Id.
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serious morbidity, and where there is strong evidence of the link between
genotype and significant disease risk. Citing to evidence of concern about
being tested for HD or AD is irrelevant to this important debate, since the
real empirical and normative questions relate to whether people would or
should refuse to learn about potentially life-saving genetic information.
BRCA is a somewhat harder case. BRCA testing does offer clinical
benefit, but it was commonly used to illustrate why we needed a RNTK
because of concerns about stigma and discrimination.194 Although it would
be an exaggeration to claim that these worries have completely dissipated,
our society seems to be moving away from worries about psychosocial
harms associated with BRCA. Rather, we seem to moving towards the view
that BRCA testing might offer positive public health benefits, so much so
that Dr. Mary-Claire King has argued for population level screening.195 Dr.
King dismissed concerns about psychosocial harms of knowing one’s
BRCA status, arguing that “women do not benefit by practices that ‘protect’
them from information regarding their own health.”196
****
In this section, I have taken a close look at the philosophical origins of
the RNTK. Contrary to what contemporary commentators have been
arguing, the notion of a strong, autonomy-based RNTK rests on an unstable
conceptual foundation. Only a handful of philosophers have endorsed such
a position, with the majority either arguing for a much more limited, nonautonomy-based conception, or even against the whole concept entirely. In
the next section, I address another commonly advanced (but poorly
defended) argument in favor of a strong RNTK: that the legal right to refuse
medical treatment includes a right to refuse medical information.

194. See Bredenoord, supra note 72, at 29 (referencing research that supports the notion that a
large percentage of people refuse genetic testing for the BRCA gene for fear of discrimination).
195. Mary Claire King et al., Population-Based Screening for BRCA1 and BRCA2, 312 JAMA
1091 (2014), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1902783.
196. Id. at 1092.
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IV. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
RIGHT NOT TO KNOW?
When thinking about legal rights in the medical realm, courts must
often confront a difficult conflict between autonomy and beneficence. The
principle of autonomy demands that an individual gets to control one’s own
body according to one’s own preferences and desires, free from imposition
by other people or institutions.197 The principle of beneficence, on the other
hand, is only concerned with achieving what is best for a person, both by
avoiding harm and by doing positive good.198 These principles can come
into tension when a person does not want something that others would
reasonably perceive to be in an individual’s best interest (or the interests of
third parties).199
Courts have struggled with this tension in end-of-life cases as medical
technology has advanced, expanding the ways in which doctors can help
people by creating new, but often invasive, methods for extending life.200 A
number of commentators have drawn a direct link between the wellestablished legal right to refuse medical treatments and the RNTK genetic
information about oneself.201 Either directly or implicitly, these scholars
seem to be asserting that a patient’s constitutionally protected autonomous
right to place limits on the medical interventions to which they are
subjected also includes the ability to broadly limit the medical information
to which they are exposed.202 As one group of prominent bioethics scholars
put it:

197. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
57–58 (5th ed. 2001).
198. Id. at 166.
199. See id. at 176 (noting that proponents of benevolence believe a “physician’s primary
obligation is to act for the patient’s medical benefit, not to encourage autonomous decisionmaking.”).
200. See id. at 142–43 (noting that “legal liability should not be imposed on physicians and
surrogates unless they have an obligation to provide or continue the treatment.”); see also id. at
176–86 (noting that the role of paternalism persists in the government sector when medical
advances are involved). See generally Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that a patient had the right to remove a nasogastric tube that had been
inserted against her will).
201. See, e.g., Burke et al., supra note 72, at 856–57 (noting that patients decline gene analysis
for a number of reasons, including limited evidence on test performance and outcomes); LázaroMuñoz et al., supra note 72, at 4 (stating that individuals have the right to control the medical test
performed, rooted in a right to bodily autonomy); Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at
1049–50 (stating that patients have the right to refuse testing and findings, even if potentially
lifesaving).
202. See Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1050 (explaining that medical
information should not be imposed upon patients since they have the right to refuse medical
testing and findings); see also Burke et al., supra note 72, at 856–57 (explaining that adult patients
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Competent adult patients have an established right to refuse
medical interventions recommended by their health-care
providers. This right is present even when medical interventions
are immediately life-saving . . . . Unless patients’ decisionmaking capacity is impaired . . . their right to refuse is virtually
unlimited. The ACMG recommendations propose, however, that
any patient accepting WES/WGS [whole genome sequencing] for
a clinical indication must also accept analysis of the 56
genes . . . .203
None of these authors have actually engaged in a rigorous legal
analysis of this claim. I do so below, concluding that the right to refuse
medical treatment cannot easily be expanded to include a right to refuse
medical information.
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
The right to refuse medical treatment can primarily trace its roots to
common-law informed consent jurisprudence204 and Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process liberty interests.205 Building on these
areas of law, courts have found a constitutionally protected privacy interest
in refusing medical treatment.206 This right has been firmly based on views
have an unlimited right to refuse doctor-recommended treatment and undergo further analysis of
their health conditions).
203. See Burke et al., supra note 72, at 856–57; see also Lázaro-Muñoz et al., supra note 72, at
11 (“Informed consent implies that the individual must freely consent in advance to medical
intervention; its negative logical corollary is that the individual is free to refuse. It is widely
recognized that the doctrine of informed consent applies to medical examinations; thus, clinicians
routinely obtain [them] before ordering genetic tests. The application of the informed consent
doctrine to genetic testing implies that individuals have a legal right to refuse genetic tests.”)
(citation omitted); see Wolf et al., Patient Autonomy, supra note 72, at 1049 (“Informed consent is
a well-established legal requirement designed to protect patient autonomy–not a matter susceptible
to modification by experts in human genetics, no matter how learned. Circumstances in which
clinicians can test without consent are rare exceptions . . . . However, this does not apply when
laboratories and clinicians perform clinical sequencing, because they are not responding to a
medical emergency threatening imminent harm and preventing them from seeking consent.”).
204. See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1890) (“No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestioning authority of the law.”); Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without the patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”); In
re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985) (“The informed consent rule rests upon the
bedrock of this state’s respect for the individual’s right to be free of unwanted bodily intrusions no
matter how well intentioned.”).
205. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the Constitutional right to
privacy).
206. See Brown, 478 So.2d at 1040 (stating that Mississippi’s Chancery Court could not
compel a woman to receive a blood transfusion after she refused one); see also In re Quinlan, 355
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about the sanctity of bodily integrity.207 As I will argue, bodily integrity is
clearly distinct from psychological integrity, therefore undermining the
claim that the right to refuse medical treatment also includes the RNTK.
One of the earliest prominent end-of-life cases was that of Karen
Quinlan.208 Ms. Quinlan was admitted to the hospital after she became
unconscious and ceased breathing for an extended period.209 Though stable,
she had experienced significant brain damage and was diagnosed as being
in a persistent vegetative state.210 As her condition deteriorated, she
eventually required artificial respiration and nasogastric feeding to
survive.211 With no prospect for improvement, her father petitioned the
court to remove the ventilator.212 His petition was opposed by a number of
parties, including Ms. Quinlan’s doctors, the hospital, and the State of New
Jersey.213 After lower courts initially denied the family’s request, the New
Jersey Supreme Court eventually found in their favor.214 They held that Ms.
Quinlan had a constitutionally protected right to privacy that would have
permitted her to refuse medical treatment if competent, and that allowed her
family to act as her surrogate since she was not competent.215
In finding an individual right to privacy, the court extensively relied on
the notion of bodily integrity. They argued that the State’s interest in
preserving life “weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the
degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.” 216 In many
cases, the importance of an individual’s right to bodily integrity can
supersede the State’s interest in preserving life.217
The Quinlan case was widely followed,218 but ultimately the Supreme
Court directly addressed the right to die in the case of Nancy Cruzan.219

A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (explaining that the individual’s right to privacy against bodily invasion
can overcome the state’s interest)
207. See S. Elizabeth Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1048–49 (1998) (stating that the right
to make medical decisions is established in the right to one’s own bodily integrity which is
derived from informed consent).
208. Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
209. Id. at 653–54.
210. Id. at 654.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 651.
213. Id. at 650.
214. See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671 (holding that Quinlan’s father has “full power to make
decisions” regarding his daughter’s medical treatment).
215. Id. at 665–66.
216. Id. at 664.
217. See id. (noting the strength of one’s right to privacy over a State’s own interests).
218. George J. Annas, “Culture of Life” Politics at the Bedside — The Case of Terri Schiavo,
352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1711 (2005) (explaining that the Quinlan case encouraged states to
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Cruzan was severely injured in a car accident.220 Although she was
discovered without a heartbeat or respiration, paramedics were able to
restore these functions, but she remained unconscious.221 It was estimated
that her brain had been without oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes, well
beyond the six-minute window when permanent brain damage is thought to
occur.222 Once it became clear that Cruzan would not recover, her parents
asked the medical staff to terminate artificial nutrition and hydration.223
The hospital refused, prompting Cruzan’s parents to seek authorization
from the courts.224 After an initial ruling in favor of the parents at the trial
court level, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.225
Much of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion focused on
explaining why the United States Constitution does not bar states from
setting evidentiary requirements about an incompetent person’s desire to be
withdrawn from life-sustaining treatments,226 which is beyond the scope of
this article. What is relevant, however, was the justification for holding that
competent individuals have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
under the due process clause in refusing medical treatment.227 Like the
Court in Quinlan, the Supreme Court relied extensively on the concept of
bodily integrity. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning built on informed
consent jurisprudence, which was in turn based on common law ideas of
battery (unwanted, offensive touching).228 He suggested that if bodily
provide legal immunity to hospitals that feared they would be sued for following advanced
directives of patients that later became incompetent).
219. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
220. Id. at 266.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 267.
224. Id. at 268.
225. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268 (1990) (detailing the back and forth decisions by the Missouri
court on the issue of informed consent).
226. Id. at 280 (explaining that the Constitution allows states to set evidentiary requirements
and that whether a state’s requirements align with the law depends on the interest the state is
seeking to protect. Additionally, a state should not have to remain neutral when an informed
person voluntarily chooses to take actions that cause her death—for example, willful starvation.).
227. Id. at 278.
228. Id. at 277 (“As these cases demonstrate, the common law doctrine of informed consent is
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment.”); see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (acknowledging that the
requirement of a vaccine for certain individuals could be cruel and inhumane and thus an
overreaching of government power); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251–52
(1891) (holding “[n]o right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
restraint or interference of others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law”);
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.E. 92, 95 (N.Y. 1914) (holding “a surgeon who
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integrity requires that one must give consent to receive medical treatment, it
follows that patients also possess the right to refuse medical treatment.229
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion to further clarify why
she believed that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment.230 Echoing the majority opinion, she
stressed the connection to bodily integrity.231 Even more than Chief Justice
Rehnquist, however, she painted a picture of the physical imposition that
life-sustaining treatment might entail:
Whether or not the techniques used to pass food and water into
the patient’s alimentary tract are termed “medical treatment,” it is
clear they all involve some degree of intrusion and restraint.
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a
physician to pass a long flexible tube through the patient’s nose,
throat and esophagus and into the stomach. Because of the
discomfort such a tube causes, “[m]any patients need to be
restrained forcibly, and their hands put into large mittens to
prevent them from removing the tube.” . . . Requiring a
competent adult to endure such procedures against her will
burdens the patient’s liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine
the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects
anything, an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject
medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and
water.232
Although the three dissenting justices did not agree with the ultimate
holding of the Court, they joined in strongly asserting that there is a

performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is liable in
damages”).
229. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (“The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that
the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”). Although the
three dissenting justices did not agree with the ultimate holding of the Court because they assert
that the right to refuse medical treatment is fundamental, their reasoning also clearly relies on
one’s autonomous right to bodily integrity. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to
be free from medical attention without consent, to determine what shall be done with one's own
body, is deeply rooted in this Nation's traditions . . . .”).
230. See id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 287 (“[T]he liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions
involving the State’s invasions into the body. Because our notions of liberty are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed
state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”)
(citation omitted).
232. Id. at 288–89.
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fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, flowing from one’s
autonomous right to bodily integrity.233
These cases involved adults who lacked capacity to make decisions
themselves, but similar language is found in cases where competent patients
refused life-saving medical treatment. For example, in Bouvia v. Superior
Court, the court affirmed the petitioner’s right to remove a nasogastric tube
that had been inserted over her objections for the purpose of providing lifesustaining nutrition.234 Ms. Bouvia was a college educated twenty-eightyear-old woman with severe cerebral palsy and quadriplegia.235 Because of
her deteriorating condition and quality of life, she repeatedly expressed a
desire to die, and intended to refuse food to accomplish that aim.236
Concerned about her weight loss, the medical staff began forced feedings,
prompting Ms. Bouvia to petition the court to intervene.237 The court found
that she did have a right to refuse medical treatment, using language clearly
focused on her right to bodily integrity like that seen in Quinlan and
Cruzan.238
Taken together, these and related cases clearly demonstrate that the
right to refuse medical treatment is specifically rooted in the idea of an
individual’s autonomous right to bodily integrity.239 This makes sense
given the strong history and legal tradition of protecting people against
physical invasion.240 In contrast, RNTK cases would raise questions about
the distinct concept of psychological integrity.241 As I will illustrate in the
next section, there are a number of domains where courts have been willing
to forcibly impose sensitive medical information on individuals, suggesting
that courts would have difficulty finding a comparable history and tradition
of protecting psychological integrity.

233. See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to be free from medical attention
without consent, to determine what shall be done with one's own body, is deeply rooted in this
Nation's traditions . . . .”).
234. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
235. Id. at 1135–36.
236. Id. at 1136.
237. Id. at 1136–37.
238. Id. at 1137 (“A person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of
control over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment.”).
239. For an extensive list of similar cases, see RONALD B. STANDLER, LEGAL RIGHT TO
REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE USA at 33–39 (2012), http://www.rbs2.com/rrmt.pdf.
240. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1125 (1997).
241. See Laurie, supra note 130, at 58 (explaining psychological integrity as the nonconnectedness with others, including “being in a state of ignorance about one’s own health”).
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B. Judicial Imposition of Medical Information
There are a number of prominent areas of law that can be used to
demonstrate the fact that the American judiciary has historically been quite
willing to impose sensitive health information on individuals who might
reasonably prefer not to know that information. While these cases are not
directly about the RNTK, taken together this jurisprudence strongly
suggests that courts would not be sympathetic to an argument that there is a
clear history and legal tradition of honoring the RNTK in the United States.
1. Mandatory Disclosure of Information to Women Seeking an
Abortion
Over the past two decades, opponents of abortion rights have
advocated for a series of state laws requiring women seeking abortions to
be given various kinds of medical information.242 Many of these disclosure
laws are generic, in the sense that they require physicians to relay standard
information relating to pregnancy, and the purported risks (physical and
psychological) of seeking an abortion.243 However, there have also been a
series of laws requiring women to be given specific information about their
fetus, including gestational age, and the (scientifically contested) fact that
an early fetus can feel pain.244 These mandatory disclosure laws are
generally seen as creating a barrier to abortion; in a sense, the state is
imposing potentially unwanted sensitive medical information on a woman
for the purpose of dissuading her from continuing with the abortion.245
Without delving too far into the contentious realm of abortion politics, I
will show that partial judicial acceptance of these laws suggests that there
are at least some cases where state interest in preserving life has been used
to justify the forced imposition of unwanted medical information by the
state.
This trend began with Planned Parenthood v. Casey.246 The law at
issue in Casey required, among other provisions, that doctors provide
women with certain information beyond that which would have been
required under standard informed consent jurisprudence.247 The Court in
242. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS
ABORTION, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last updated Nov.
1, 2015).
243. See id. (describing various states laws requiring women to hear general information about
their pregnancy including risks of an abortion or counseling for receiving an abortion); Erin
Bernstein, The Upside of Abortion Disclosure Laws, 24 STANFORD L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 174
(2013).
244. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 242.
245. Bernstein, supra note 243, at 174.
246. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
247. Id. at 844.
FOR
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Casey concluded that provisions entailing truthful, non-misleading
information relevant to the decision of whether or not to go through with
the abortion did not impose an undue burden on the woman seeking an
abortion.248 They argued that although all pre-viability regulations burden a
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion to some degree, an abortion law is not
rendered unconstitutional just because it may make getting an abortion
more difficult or more expensive, as long as the burden isn’t too
substantial.249 Subsequent laws have expanded disclosure requirements,
requiring doctors to provide scientifically questionable information, not to
enhance informed consent, but to advance the state’s interest in preserving
life or mitigating abortion’s negative effects.250
In the past two decades, these abortion laws have begun to evolve and
expand, recently adding provisions that require women to receive and view
ultrasound images251 and hear the fetal heartbeat,252 even if they would
prefer otherwise. Since they have been the most controversial, I will focus
on mandatory ultrasound laws. As of 2015, three states mandate that
women seeking an abortion view an ultrasound image of the fetus.253
Another ten states require the provider to perform the procedure and offer
an opportunity for the women to see the image.254 An additional fourteen
states require that women be given an opportunity to see an ultrasound
image under certain circumstances.255
These laws have been challenged, and the judicial response has been
split. In Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit struck down a law requiring
narration of ultrasounds.256 The law at issue was North Carolina’s
248. Id. at 882 (“If the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is
truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.”).
249. Id. at 874 (“Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of
increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other
medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at
the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure
an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
250. Bernstein, supra note 243, at 173.
251. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last updated Oct. 1, 2015) (noting
that twenty-five states currently have such provisions).
252. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir. 2011)
(considering a South Dakota law on informed consent); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 497 (7th
Cir. 1999) (concluding that the physician should advise women how to obtain the services of
ultrasound imaging and auscultation of the fetal heartbeat if she chooses to do so).
253. GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 251 (Louisiana, Texas, and Wisconsin).
254. Id. (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Virginia).
255. Id.
256. 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Woman’s Right to Know Act,257 which set forth a real-time viewing
mandate requiring physicians to perform an ultrasound, display the image,
and describe the fetus to a woman seeking an abortion.258 The law
stipulated that the description must continue, even if the woman turns away
or otherwise attempts to avoid hearing what the doctor is saying.259
Providers brought suit, arguing that this violated their free speech rights.260
The court struck down the law under the First Amendment, holding that it
was impermissible compelled speech because it “is ideological in intent and
in kind.”261
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that a similar law does not
violate providers’ First Amendment rights.262 Like Stuart, the law in this
case compelled doctors to take and display sonogram images of the fetus,
play the sound of the fetal heartbeat, and explain the results of both exams
to the woman seeking an abortion.263 Furthermore, the woman had to
certify that the physician complied with the law’s requirements, forcing her
to acknowledge the unwanted information that had been conveyed.264
Equating these requirements with those upheld in earlier cases, the court
argued that “required disclosures of a sonogram, the fetal heartbeat, and
their medical descriptions are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading
information.”265
Without engaging with the fundamental appropriateness of these laws,
we can take three tentative lessons from the forced ultrasound controversy.
First, though controversial, there appears to be significant political support
for forcing or strongly encouraging women to view ultrasound images. The
fact that a significant number of states have been willing to pass these laws
undermines any claim that there is unwavering support for a broad RNTK
unwanted medical information. Second, the circuit split suggests that some
courts are willing to entertain the idea that the state’s interest in preserving
life overrides an individual’s right to make decisions about the kind of
medical information that is revealed to them. Notably, the Supreme Court

257. North Carolina Women’s Right to Know Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92
(2011).
258. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 243.
261. Id. at 242. See also Pruitt v. Nova Health Sys., 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013) (striking down a
mandatory ultrasound law pursuant to Casey).
262. Tex Med Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir.
2012).
263. See id. at 573; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2014).
264. Tex Med Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir.
2012).
265. Id. at 577–78.
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has refused to resolve the existing circuit split.266 Finally, it should be
stressed that the courts that overturned the mandatory ultrasound laws did
so on the basis of First Amendment jurisprudence rather than an individual
RNTK.267 If protecting an individual’s RNTK was clearly included in the
well-established right to refuse treatment, it stands to reason the courts
would have at least partially relied on that as a component of their
reasoning.
2. Court-Ordered Genetic Testing in Toxic Tort Cases
Toxic torts are civil actions arising from alleged harm suffered by a
plaintiff who was exposed to a “chemical substance, emission, or
product.”268 In order to recover, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or
she was exposed to the relevant chemical, and that the exposure resulted in
demonstrable, significant, and lasting physical or psychological harm.269 A
paradigmatic case might involve an individual with a cancer diagnosis (e.g.,
lung cancer) who claims to have been exposed to a carcinogenic chemical
(e.g., asbestos) in an industrial setting.270
Since many medical conditions can be mediated by genetic
susceptibility to illness, parties to toxic torts cases, particularly defendants,
have reason to seek relevant genetic testing of the plaintiff, particularly as
genetic tests have become more sophisticated.271 Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, courts have the power to “order a party whose mental or
physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to submit to
a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or certified
examiner.”272
Legal scholars have recognized, however, that court-mandated genetic
testing can be intrusive and can lead to individual harm.273 For example,
Anthony Niedwiecki has criticized Rule 35, arguing:
266. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Cases on Pre-Abortion Ultrasounds, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 2015.
267. See David Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 9, 9 (2015) (explaining that states impose mandates on abortion providers based on the
First Amendment and the doctrine of informed consent).
268. KAREN A. GOTTLIEB, TOXIC TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE 5 (Spring ed. 2015).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Randi B. Weiss et al., The Use of Genetic Testing in the Courtroom, 34 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 889, 889 (1999) (“as testing methodologies become more sophisticated, the use of genetic
test results is likely to expand, particularly in toxic tort litigation, to provide evidence of
causation.”).
272. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(1).
273. See Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by
Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 888–89
(1996) (arguing that genetic testing should never be compelled because of concerns about non-
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These risks become even more prevalent when the genetic
information reveals a disease or disorder that is incurable or
untreatable. Without an analysis of the informational risks, courts
fail to fully understand the depth of intrusiveness caused by the
Rule 35 examination. Analyzing the informational risks
associated with the test requires a close examination of the
potential impact that the information garnered from the test could
have on the individual being tested. The impact may be
psychological trauma to the individual tested, as well as a
violation of privacy through disclosure of the results to sources
outside of the litigation.274
Nevertheless, Rule 35 has been widely interpreted as allowing a compelled
test if there is “good cause” to seek the medical information, and if the
information is relevant to the individual’s health status that is “in
controversy” due to litigation.275 As a result, examples of compelled
genetic testing abound.276
Furthermore, Hoffmann and Rothenberg conducted a survey of judges,
asking whether they would compel genetic testing in a variety of
scenarios.277 Judges were sensitive to the psychosocial concerns associated
with forced genetic testing, particularly “the psychological impact of
receiving unwanted information about a lethal and incurable genetic
condition.”278 Nevertheless, approximately 80% of the judges surveyed
indicated that they would still compel genetic testing to determine whether
a genetic condition either made the plaintiff especially sensitive to pain or
was the most likely cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Further, over 70% said
they would order such testing to determine whether the plaintiff had a
genetic condition necessary for a given toxic exposure to produce
disease.279
maleficence and autonomy); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. &
POL’Y 7, 35–36 (2006) (raising concerns about the privacy and discrimination risks to plaintiffs
whose genetic information is placed into evidence); Jennifer M. Champagne, Genetic Testing and
Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Admissibility and Evaluation”, 13 N. C. J.L. & TECH 1, 24
(2011) (“[g]iven the highly personal and sensitive nature of genetic data, there is a strong need to
take precautions to prevent others from gaining access to such information.”).
274. Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Science Fact or Science Fiction? The Implications of CourtOrdered Genetic Testing Under Rule 35, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 339 (2000).
275. Id. at 301–02.
276. See id. at 299–300 (stating that Rule 35 and similar state rules have provided courts with
wide authority to order genetic testing).
277. Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, Judging Genes: Implications of the Second
Generation of Genetic Tests in the Courtroom, 66 MD. L. REV. 858, 873–74 (2007).
278. Id. at 908.
279. See id. at 880–84 (observing that judges appreciated the objectiveness of genetic testing in
these scenarios where the results can either rule out alternate causes or validate the plaintiff’s
allegations to help make the decision process easier and more accurate). See also Diane E.
Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg, When Should Judges Admit or Compel Genetic Tests?, 310
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3. Duty to Warn Cases
There have been a number of significant cases about medical
professionals’ duty to warn others about information revealed in the course
of treating a patient.280 These cases are instructive because they bring into
focus the tension between a patient’s rights (e.g., privacy, confidentiality,
autonomy) and third-party interests. What becomes apparent through an
examination of this jurisprudence is the fact that courts appear quite willing
to override the former when sufficient justification exists, often for reasons
that sound very much like those that would be used to override a RNTK
(e.g., preventing harm to third parties, preservation of life).281
Since clinical genetic testing is relatively new, there haven’t been
many cases directly addressing the obligations of physicians vis-à-vis
disclosure of hereditary health risk information to relatives.282 The two
most prominent cases, however, seem to suggest that courts believe that
physicians have a duty to consider the interests beyond those of their
specific patient.283 In Pate v. Threlkel, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a
late stage form of medullary thyroid carcinoma, a hereditary disease that her
mother had been treated for three years earlier.284 Pate sued her mother’s
physicians arguing that they had possessed a duty to educate their patient
about the genetic nature of her disease, so that she could have an
opportunity to pass that information on to her children.285 The court found

SCIENCE 241, 241–42 (2005) (confirming the results of judges’ preferences to compel a test “to
establish that the defendant’s negligence was not the cause of the plaintiff’s injury” because
confirming a diagnosis is more objective than predicting one).
280. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347–48 (Cal. 1976); Safer v.
Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1996).
281. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345–48 (holding that a psychologist has an obligation of
confidentiality to his or her patients, but under reasonable circumstances where a third party is
most likely to become a potential victim of the patient, the psychologist has a duty to warn the
third party); Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192 (holding that a physician owes a duty to warn patient’s
family member(s) of genetic disorders that can be avoidable or treated properly if addressed earlyon).
282. Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 277, at 865–66, n.16 (recognizing that newer genetic
testing that goes beyond simple DNA fingerprinting has been slow to become a viable resource in
litigation).
283. See, e.g., Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So.2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995) (“[W]hen the prevailing
standard of care creates a duty that is obviously for the benefit of certain identified third parties
and the physician knows of the existence of those third parties, then the physician’s duty runs to
those third parties.”); Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div.
1996) (recognizing that duty is owed not only to the patient himself but that it also “extend[s]
beyond the interests of a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient who may be
adversely affected by a breach of that duty”) (quoting Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839
(N.J. 1981).
284. Pate, 661 So.2d at 279.
285. Id.
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that there was a duty to warn about the genetic component of a disease, but
that simply informing the patient could discharge this duty.286
A year later, in Safer v. Estate of Pack, a New Jersey appellate court
went further, ruling that physicians have an even broader duty to warn
third-party relatives about genetic information.287 This case had similar
facts to Pate, in that a parent was diagnosed with a hereditary disease
(colorectal cancer), which his daughter (the plaintiff) also subsequently
acquired.288 The patient’s daughter argued that her father’s physician had a
duty to warn at-risk relatives so that they could seek out early monitoring
and/or treatment to mitigate the course of the disease.289 Pushing well past
the holding in Pate, this court found that simply disclosing the information
to the patient might not discharge the physician’s duty to warn.290 Arguing
that genetic risk is analogous to an infectious public health threat,291 the
court required that “reasonable steps be taken to assure that the information
reaches those likely to be affected or is made available for their benefit.”292
Recognizing that this expanded duty entails making trade-offs, the court
acknowledged that sometimes the wishes of the patient might have to be
overridden for the benefit of their relatives.293 Speculating about a case
where there was evidence that a patient explicitly requested not to disclose
genetic risk to relatives, the court made it clear that they were willing to
consider asking “whether, as a matter of law, there are or ought to be any
limits on physician-patient confidentiality.”294
Without a strong line of comparable cases, it is hard to know exactly
how far courts will be willing to push this issue. Safer was subsequently
overturned by the New Jersey legislature, and has not been widely
followed. Subsequent academic commentary was generally negative
286. Id. at 280–82 (holding that a physician has an indirect duty to significant third parties who
are within the “zone of foreseeable risk” of harm or danger, thus the physician only needs to
inform his or her patient of this harm or danger in hopes that the patient will relay the information
to the pertinent third parties).
287. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1192.
288. Id. at 1189–90 (identifying multiple polyposis as a hereditary disease that can develop
into colorectal cancer if left untreated); see also Pate, 661 So.2d at 279 (Fla. 1995) (identifying
medullary thyroid carcinoma as the genetic disease that was transferred to the patient’s daughter).
289. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
290. Id. at 1192 (“We decline to hold as the Florida Supreme Court did in Pate v. Thelkel, that,
in all circumstances, the duty to warn will be satisfied by informing the patient.”).
291. Id. (“In terms of foreseeability especially, there is no essential difference between the type
of genetic threat at issue here and the menace of infection, contagion or a threat of physical
harm.”).
292. Id.
293. See id. at 1192–93 (“It may be necessary, at some stage, to resolve a conflict between the
physician's broader duty to warn and his fidelity to an expressed preference of the patient that
nothing be said to family members about the details of the disease.”).
294. Id. at 1193.
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(presaging many of the arguments that would be made more than a decade
later in the RNTK debate),295 though a major genetic professional society
issued guidance that physicians should be permitted to breach a patient’s
confidentiality under limited circumstances.296 At the very least, it is
reasonable to say that these cases suggest that courts might be willing to
consider placing limits on patient control over their own genetic
information. To say something more definitive, we have to look to a betterdeveloped area of law with very clear parallels to genetic testing: forced
HIV testing and/or disclosure of HIV-status.
The forced HIV testing jurisprudence provides strong evidence that
courts are readily willing to override individual preferences about receiving
or disclosing sensitive medical information.297 The validity of compelled
testing and disclosure has been regularly disputed, but these challenges

295. See, e.g., Kenneth Offit et al., The “Duty to Warn” a Patient’s Family Members About
Hereditary Disease Risks, 292 JAMA 1469, 1472 (2004) (arguing that “physicians are in no
position to undertake the primary responsibility for identifying and communicating with an untold
number of their patients’ relatives who might be at some unspecified risk from genetic
predispositions” because it would create impractical burdens that “discourage physician
involvement in the merging subspecialty of genetic medicine”); Faith Lagay, A Physician’s Role
in Informing Family Members of Genetic Risk, 7 AMA J. ETHICS, June 1, 2005 (concluding that
the AMA guideline for medical ethics “does not—explicitly or implicitly—encourage physicians
to breach patient confidentiality.”); Lisa S. Lehmann et al., Disclosure of Familial Genetic
Information: Perceptions of the Duty to Inform, 109 AM. J. MED. 705, 709 (2000) (finding that the
majority of women surveyed “did not believe that physicians should breach the confidentiality of
genetic information”); Gary N. McAbee et al., Commentary, Physician’s Duty to Warn Third
Parties About the Risk of Genetic Diseases, 102 PEDIATRICS 140, 141–42 (1998) (arguing that
these cases have necessitated overriding legislation “to establish more appropriate guidelines”).
296. See AM. SOC’Y HUMAN GENETICS SOCIAL ISSUES SUBCOMM. ON FAMILIAL
DISCLOSURE, PROFESSIONAL DISCLOSURE OF FAMILIAL GENETIC INFORMATION, 62 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 474, 474 (1998) (stating that disclosure should be allowed when “attempts to encourage
disclosure on the part of the patient have failed; where the harm is highly likely to occur and is
serious and foreseeable; where the at-risk relative(s) is identifiable; and where either the disease is
preventable/treatable or medically accepted standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce
the genetic risk,” and when “[t]he harm that may result from failure to disclose should outweigh
the harm that may result from disclosure.”). But see AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Op. 2.131 (2003)
(stressing the physician’s duty of confidentiality and limiting the physician’s role to facilitating
the disclosure by the patient); Sara Taub et al., Managing Familial Risk in Genetic Testing, 8
GENETICS TESTING 356, 358 (2004) (citing two different guidelines for familial disclosure–The
American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) and The President’s Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research–to demonstrate that
breach of confidentiality would only be justified in rare situations); AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL
ONCOLOGY, American Society of Clinical Oncology, Policy Statement Update: Genetic Testing
for Cancer Susceptibility, 21 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2397, 2397 (2003) (counseling providers to
“remind patients of the importance of communicating test results to family members . . . ”).
297. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Validity, and Propriety Under Circumstances, of CourtOrdered HIV Testing, 87 A.L.R. 5th 631, § I(2)(a) (2001) (demonstrating that some courts have
used their inherent authority to mandate HIV testing regardless of the preferences of the parties).
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have nearly always been dismissed.298 It should be noted that the courts
have not imposed HIV testing blindly, recognizing that, like genetic
information, there can be very real psychosocial risks associated with
unwanted disclosure of an individual’s HIV status.299 Despite readily
recognizing these concerns, courts have still compelled testing, arguing that
concerns about the RNTK are outweighed by a range of legitimate
justifications.300 While these cases have predominantly been brought in the
criminal context,301 there are also a number of civil decisions that
demonstrate courts’ willingness to consider interests beyond those of
patient autonomy.302
In addition to case law, there are a number of federal and state HIV
non-disclosure laws that also provide evidence of our political willingness
to override an individual’s ability to control their own sensitive health
information.303 These laws generally prohibit disclosure of someone’s HIV
298. Id. (noting that several courts have reasoned and held that mandated HIV testing does not
violate an individual’s right to equal protection, prohibition of ex post facto laws, freedom of
religion, due process, or privacy).
299. See, e.g., Agosto v. Trusswal Systems Corp., 142 F.R.D. 118, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (“The
Court is aware of the delicate nature of HIV and AIDS-related information. Given the nature of
the disease and the public’s attitudes towards those who contract AIDS or test positive for the HIV
virus, Plaintiff's desire to protect the confidentiality of this information is understandable.”);
Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 901–02 (V.I. 1991) (recognizing that although blood
testing is innocuous and commonplace for routine health screening, revealing whether an
individual has HIV has more “devastating consequences” due to “prejudice and apprehension that
its diagnosis typically signifies a social death as concrete as the physical one which follows”);
State v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 488, 493 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowledging that when
testing an adolescent for HIV, “a positive test result would likely be psychologically traumatic,
given the absence of a present cure for AIDS”).
300. Miller, supra note 297, at II(B)(1)6 §11(a) (noting that courts use a balancing test,
weighing the interests of opposing parties, to justify testing in a range of situations). See, e.g.,
Agosto, 142 F.R.D. at 120 (holding that although plaintiff has privacy rights to protect his HIV
status, if plaintiff is to continue with a suit in order to recover for pain and suffering from his
employer, it would be necessary to disclose his health status, including his HIV diagnosis); Virgin
Islands, 756 F. Supp. at 904 (stating that “the Government has a substantial interest in curbing the
transmission of HIV” because “[t]he outcome of a potential source’s test affects the degree to
which a person should undertake precautionary measures to ensure the virus is not spread to
others,” which in effect outweighs the defendant’s right to privacy); State, 930 P.2d at 493
(concluding that “the State’s interest in assisting victims [of sexual crimes] significantly
outweighs the privacy interest of the juvenile” in resisting HIV testing).
301. See Miller, supra note 297, at I §2(a), II(A)(1) §3, §6 (demonstrating that courts have
been willing to impose HIV testing in a range of criminal contexts, including sexual assault,
prostitution, and intravenous drug use).
302. Id. at III.B (demonstrating that courts have been willing to impose HIV testing in a range
of civil cases, even in the face of a number of challenges, such as Fourth Amendment
unreasonable search and seizure, Equal Protection, ex post facto laws, freedom of religion,
substantive Due Process, and the right to privacy).
303. See State Statutes or Regulations Expressly Governing Disclosure of Fact That Person
Has Tested Positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS), A.L.R. 5th 149, 159–60, 169–70.
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status, but typically contain a set of exceptions. Most commonly, HIVstatus can be revealed when there is a “compelling need” or “good
cause.”304 While these terms have been subject to judicial interpretation,
courts have interpreted them broadly, allowing disclosure in a wide range of
contexts.305 Similarly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule contains a public interest exception, which
allows medical professionals to disclose “individually identifiable health
information” when there is a “serious and imminent threat to the health or
safety of a person or the public.”306
***
The cases establishing a right to refuse medical treatment are explicitly
rooted in our history and tradition of protecting bodily integrity, never
mentioning the distinct concept of psychological integrity. In a RNTK case
of first impression, the question is whether courts would readily expand
established protection of bodily integrity to incorporate protection of an
individual’s psychological integrity. This seems unlikely. Given the
controversial debate about the scope and propriety of substantive due
process jurisprudence,307 courts seem to have become reluctant to
haphazardly expand constitutionally protected liberty interests.308 The
current judicial approach appears to involve carefully “identifying a narrow
category of liberty interests that are deemed sufficiently ‘fundamental’ to
warrant heightened scrutiny . . . .”309
There appears to be enough judicial acceptance of infringement on
psychological integrity that one can reasonably predict that courts would
find purchase in the distinction between physical and psychological
integrity. It is unlikely that courts would be willing to independently
establish psychological integrity as a right requiring constitutional
protection, given the lack of a clear history and legal tradition of such
protections, and the fact that it would be monumentally difficult to establish
the contours of protection for a concept as amorphous and potentially
304. Id. at 159–60.
305. Id. (demonstrating that courts have upheld exceptions for mandatory disclosure of HIVstatus in a range of contexts, including for surgeons, defendant in prostitution cases, and where
there is a “clear and imminent danger to individual's health”).
306. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2014).
307. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 411 (2010) (“Critics of substantive due process have condemned the doctrine as, among other
things, a “contradiction in terms,” an “oxymoron,” a “momentous sham,” a “made-up, atextual
invention,” and the “most anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law.” Substantive due process
“has been criticized both as textually implausible and as contrary to basic principles of democratic
self-government.”).
308. See id. at 510–11 (noting the controversy and opposition in some circles to modern
substantive due process decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas and Roe v. Wade).
309. Id. at 427.
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expansive as psychological integrity. Having critically argued against the
philosophical and legal arguments for a strong RNTK, in the next section I
marshal social science and psychology data to demonstrate that the RNTK
is a malleable concept, and to make a series of positive arguments against
the status quo position of honoring a strong RNTK.

V. MOVING AWAY FROM A STRONG RNTK
In Part II, I described the various arguments that recent commentators
and scholars have made in favor of honoring a strong RNTK. While these
voices represented a clear majority position, I believe that there are a
number of compelling arguments in defense of a more skeptical view about
the RNTK. In this Part, I begin by presenting data suggesting that the
strength of people’s views about the RNTK is much softer than one might
believe, leading us to reconsider the propriety of instinct to frame the
RNTK as such a strong right. I then reframe the debate away from an
autonomy-dominated perspective, providing a comprehensive analysis of
the harms and benefits that result from adhering to a strong RNTK position.
From this analysis, I conclude that the potential health benefits of
abandoning a strong RNTK greatly outweigh the concomitant harms,
thereby challenging the idea that psychosocial concerns should
automatically get to trump the prospect of life-saving intervention. Finally,
I end by exploring two additional considerations that are relevant to any
rigorous discussion of the RNTK: moral distress and genetic
exceptionalism.
A. The Identified Life Effect
There seems to be overwhelming support for the RNTK in the genetics
community.310 In a survey of genetics professionals, when asked how they
would respond to a patient that declined to receive results from the ACMG
list, only 19% said that they would return findings regardless of the
patient’s preferences.311 Qualitative data similarly supports the claim that
the RNTK is held to be of paramount important.312

310. See generally Yu et al., supra note 92, at 79 (stating that “[t]he vast majority of genetics
professionals agreed that the preferences of a patient or family should guide which incidental
results are offered for return”).
311. Id.
312. See Grove et al., supra note 93, at 6–7; ACMG, supra note 94, at 664–65
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These studies are informative, but potentially misleading because of a
psychological bias known as the identified life (or victim) effect.313 This
phenomenon is related to people’s greater willingness to help specific,
identified people, relative to abstract or theoretical ideas of people in
need.314 Functionally, the idea is that people aren’t very good at
understanding tradeoffs in the abstract, but are much better at weighing
costs and benefits in a specific, concrete scenario.315 Schelling, in his
seminal work on the economics of preventing human death, highlighted the
distinction between individual and aggregate lives, arguing that people do
not feel an emotional tie to a “statistical life” and are therefore less
motivated to provide help to unidentified victims.316 For example, stories
about specific victims elicit significantly higher levels of charitable
donations compared to anonymous victims.317 There is often a substantial
spike in emergency aid donations in the months after a major disaster, even
though there is perpetual chronic need for such assistance.318 In the medical
realm, there is evidence that physicians make different decisions when
evaluating an individual patient than when considering an anonymous
group of comparable patients.319 It appears that physicians give more
weight to patients’ individual concerns when considering them on their own
and more weight to general criteria of effectiveness when considering them
as a group.320
It shouldn’t be surprising then, that while there is certainly strong
support for the RNTK in the abstract, there is reason to believe that support
is softer than it appears. Asking about the RNTK in the abstract unduly

313. Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The “Identified Victim” Effect: An Identified Group, or Just
a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 158 (2005).
314. See id. at 164–65.
315. Karen E. Jenni & George Loewenstein, Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, 14 J.
RISK UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997); Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a
Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 5, 11 (2003)
(arguing that identifiable victims seem to produce a greater empathic response, accompanied by
greater willingness to make personal sacrifices to provide aid); George Loewenstein et al.,
Statistical, Identifiable, and Iconic Victims, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE at 34–35, 44
(Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (showing that people respond more strongly to
identifiable rather than statistical victims even when identification provides absolutely no
information about the victims).
316. Thomas C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127, 129–30 (Samuel B. Chase ed., 1968).
317. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 313, at 161–62.
318. Deborah A. Small et al., Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative Thought
on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 143, 143–44, 152 (2007).
319. Donald A. Redelmeier & Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical Decisions for
Individual Patients and for Groups, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1162 (1990).
320. Id.
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focuses the respondent solely on respect for autonomy. Conversely, real
world cases that highlight a tension between autonomy and beneficence can
cause support for the RNTK to drop significantly.
Take the scenario outlined in the introduction: P is having her genome
sequenced as part of a diagnostic work-up for what is suspected to be a rare
genetic disorder. During the informed consent process, she clearly checks
the box opting not to receive any incidental genetic results. During their
analysis of her genomic data, her physicians happen to find evidence of
high genetic risk for Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colon Cancer (“HNPCC”).
They believe that this information will prevent serious disease and perhaps
even save P’s life. Should they disclose the finding, even though P
indicated that she did not want to receive any secondary findings?
A survey of 800 Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) members and
staff about their views on genetic incidental findings (“GIFs”) demonstrates
how malleable views on the RNTK can be.321 Respondents were first asked
about the RNTK in the abstract: “Do research participants have a right not
to know their own genetic information? In other words, would it be
acceptable for them to choose not to receive any GIFs?”322 When presented
in this abstract manner, an overwhelming majority (96%) endorsed the
RNTK.323 But when asked a version of the above case where a specific
patient has chosen not to receive incidental findings, only 35% indicated
that the individual’s RNTK should definitely be respected, and 28% said
that they would probably honor the request not to know.324 Interestingly,
the percentage of respondents who indicated that they did not support the
RNTK increased from 2% at baseline to 26% when presented with the
specific case.325 The percentage of people who are unsure similarly jumps,
from 1% to 11%.326
These data demonstrate that support for a strong RNTK is soft; while
autonomy and the RNTK may seem sacrosanct in isolation, forcing people
to confront the tradeoffs inherent in real world scenarios changes many
minds. This suggests that practical conceptions about the RNTK are less
absolute than some of the recent literature would have us believe.

321. Catherine Gliwa et al., Institutional Review Board Perspectives on Obligations to
Disclose Genetic Incidental Findings to Research Participants, GENETICS MED., Nov. 19, 2015
(advance online publication).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 4.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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B. Analyzing the Impact of a Strong RNTK
If views on the RNTK are less settled than one might have previously
believed, and if people are open to considering tradeoffs between autonomy
and beneficence, then it becomes important to rigorously examine what
those tradeoffs might entail. This kind of analysis has thus far been absent
from the RNTK debate. The focus on an autonomy-based RNTK has had
the unfortunate effect of short-circuiting discussion of the topic.327
Specifically, the autonomy-dominated conversation has focused on the
harms associated with not honoring individual preferences.328 That focus
has not allowed for a comprehensive analysis of the harms and benefits of
honoring or ignoring the RNTK. The reality is any policy will have
potential negative consequences. Whichever option is chosen, we will
necessarily be making a mistake in one of two directions: unwanted
disclosure, or lost opportunity for medical intervention. In this section, I lay
out the full set of relevant considerations, and explore some of the relevant
empirical data that can help us to fully assess the overall impact of any
RNTK policy.
Specifically, there are three empirical questions that should be
carefully considered. The first two questions are necessary to understand
the scope and magnitude of harms that would result from a decision to
create policies that de-emphasize a strong RNTK, asking about the
frequency and magnitude of possible harms from unwanted disclosure: (1)
How many people genuinely don’t want to know genetic information about
themselves if it could have a profound impact on morbidity or mortality?
(2) If people were given genetic risk information that they would have
preferred not to know, what is the magnitude of the harm they actually
experience? The third question explores the possible negative ramifications
of honoring a strong RNTK: (3) If we actively solicit patient preferences for
knowing or not knowing, how many people undergoing genomic
sequencing would erroneously or accidentally fail to be notified of
potentially lifesaving information?
1. How many people genuinely don’t want to know genetic
information about themselves if it could have a profound impact
on morbidity or mortality?
Available data support the reasonable claim that the overwhelming
majority of people would want to be given genetic risk information that will

327. Supra Part III.B.
328. Supra Part III.B.1.
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have a direct impact on their health.329 For example, in one study, nearly all
respondents wanted to learn about a range of genetic risk factors, with 90%
wanting to learn about non-actionable health risks and 96% wanting to learn
about actionable genetic risk factors.330 Similarly, in the largest study to
date of views toward the return of incidental findings resulting from
sequencing research, nearly 5,000 members of the public were surveyed and
nearly all of them (98%) wanted to learn about genetic risk for lifethreatening conditions that can be prevented.331 A strong majority even
wanted to know about life-threatening conditions that cannot be treated.332
So as a baseline, it seems fair to say that the vast majority of people would
actively want to know high-value health information, which I’m defining as
genetic findings associated with conditions where medical action can
mitigate or prevent mortality or serious morbidity, and where there is strong
evidence of the link between genotype and significant disease risk.
Of course, that leaves some very small subset of the population who
might not want to know this information. Although this is an empirical
question that requires further study, it seems reasonable to assume that this
small set of people who would not want to know is primarily comprised of
individuals for whom clinical action might not be indicated (e.g., patients
with a terminal illness, the elderly, people with a religious objection to
receiving medical treatment, etc.).333 Proponents of the RNTK point to
these kinds of examples in defense of their views.334 My counter-argument,
which I will develop in more detail below, is that these relatively rare
examples should not drive the RNTK debate; we should not be creating a
broad RNTK policy based on a limited set of cases where the medical

329. See, e.g., David Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions About a
Large Genetic Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 836–38 (2008); Anna Middleton et al.,
Attitudes of Nearly 7000 Health Professionals, Genomic Researchers and Publics Toward the
Return of Incidental Results from Sequencing Research, EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1, 5 (2015);
Martha F. Wright et al., Preferences for Results Delivery from Exome Sequencing/Genome
Sequencing, 16 GENETICS MED. 442, 443–44 (2014); Nedal Arar et al., Preferences Regarding
Genetic Research Results: Comparing Veterans and Nonveterans Responses, 13 PUB. HEALTH
GENOMICS 431, 432–47 (2010); Juli M. Bollinger et al., Public Preferences Regarding the Return
of Individual Genetic Research Results: Findings from a Qualitative Focus Group Study, 14
GENETICS IN MED. 451, 452, 455 (2012); Tineke M. Meulenkamp et al., Communication of
Biobanks’ Research Results: What Do (Potential) Participants Want?, 152A AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 2482, 2486, 2488 (2010); Juli Murphy et al., Public Expectations for Return of Results
from Large-Cohort Genetic Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 36, 38, 41 (2008); Layla Shahmirzadi
et al., Patient Decisions for Disclosure of Secondary Findings among the First 200 Individuals
Undergoing Clinical Diagnostic Exome Sequencing, 16 GENETICS MED. 395, 397 (2014).
330. Kaufman et al., supra note 329, at 835.
331. Middleton et al., supra note 329, at 1.
332. Id. at 4, 6.
333. See Wright et al., supra note 329, at 444–47.
334. See supra Part II.B.
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information actually has little or no value to the individual. Rather, these
cases can be addressed separately, because they represent scenarios where
doctors can reasonably anticipate a need to actively solicit preferences.
2. If people were given genetic risk information that they would
have preferred not to know, what is the magnitude of the harm
they actually experience?
a. Psychological harms
If the vast majority of people would want to know important genetic
risk information, and if most of those who wouldn’t want to know can be
bracketed, we are arguably left with an exceedingly small set of people.
More empirical research is needed to ascertain the exact size and
composition of this group, but whatever that number turns out to be, the
next task is to examine the magnitude of harm that this small group will
experience if given information that they would have preferred not to know.
As discussed above, RNTK proponents frequently make claims about the
danger of psychological harms flowing from disclosure of negative genetic
information.335 These claims rely on limited data related to a few poorlytargeted examples like HD and AD.336 What can the broader psychological
literature tell us about our reactions to unfortunate genetic information?
The short answer is that psychological research has demonstrated that
people are terrible at affective forecasting, or predicting our future
emotional reaction to both positive and negative events.337 For example,
recent lottery winners typically overestimate the length and duration of their
spike in happiness.338 Similarly, but in the opposite direction, people who
have recently lost a loved one overestimate the length and duration of their
negative emotional response to the traumatic event.339 In both cases, after
an initial spike, people gradually tend to return to their previous baseline

335. See supra Part III.A.
336. See supra Part III.B.4.
337. See, e.g., Elisabeth W. Dunn & Simon M. Laham, Affective Forecasting: A User’s Guide
to Emotional Time Travel, in AFFECT IN SOCIAL THINKING AND BEHAVIOR 177, 177–78 (Joseph
P. Forgas ed., 2006); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in 35
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345, 346, 401 (James M. Olson & Mark P.
Zanna eds., 2003); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting Knowing What
to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131, 134 (2005).
338. Brett Pelham, Affective Forecasting: The Perils of Predicting Future Feelings, PSYCHOL.
SCI. AGENDA (Apr. 2004), http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2004/04/pelham.aspx.
339. Id.
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level of happiness.340 It appears that individuals are generally much more
emotionally adaptable than they might realize.
This is also true in the medical realm, where the literature suggests that
an individual’s predictions concerning the emotional consequence of
learning about genetic disease risk do not square with people’s actual ability
to adapt to negative health information.341 In a broad range of medical
contexts, there are data showing that the affective forecasting bias is
particularly pronounced when healthy people are asked to assess the
negative emotional impact of (theoretical) future health problems.342
Specifically, people generally assume that receiving negative genetic
information will be devastating, but research demonstrates that people are
much better at coping with negative information than they think they will
be.343 In reality, the negative psychological effect of receiving positive risk
information for many untreatable conditions is generally transient and
mild.344
Of particular interest are the concepts of immune neglect and focal
illusion. Immune neglect deals with “the failure to anticipate how easily and
quickly we make sense of and adapt to negative events.”345 Essentially, the
body has a sort of psychological immune system, which helps people deal
with negative information, often making the actual impact of negative
information significantly smaller than the expected negative impact.346
However, when making a prediction about future emotional responses, we
disregard our ability to cope, thereby overestimating the negative impact of
information.347 Relatedly, the focal illusion bias “is the tendency to focus
on the affective consequences of a single, focal future event, while ignoring
the emotional impact of non-focal events on well-being.”348 This bias
causes us to pay more attention to the negative implications of the topic at
hand (i.e., the genetic test result that was just returned) while ignoring the

340. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 337, at 369, 393 (finding that
people’s emotional reactions become less intense with time, in a phenomenon called emotional
evanescence).
341. Jodi Halpern & Robert M. Arnold, Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in
Making Serious Health Decisions, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1708, 1708, 1710 (2008) (finding
that people fail to predict their own ability to adapt to declines in health).
342. S.A. Peters et al., The Future in Clinical Genetics: Affective Forecasting Biases in Patient
and Clinician Decision Making, 85 CLINICAL GENETICS 312, 313–14 (2014).
343. Id.
344. See id. (describing studies in which patients’ emotional responses were less extreme than
anticipated).
345. Id. at 313.
346. Id.
347. Peters et al., supra note 342, at 313–14 (2014).
348. Id. at 313.
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positive mitigating effects that other aspects of life might offer (e.g., family,
hobbies, etc.).349
While the field hasn’t “systematically considered such biases in
clinical genetics,”350 there is a growing body of data supporting the claim
that concerns about psychological reactions to negative genetic results are
likely overblown.351 One systematic review of 15 published papers on
predictive genetic testing for a range of conditions found “no increased
distress (general and situational distress, anxiety, and depression) in carriers
or non-carriers at any point during the 12 months after testing.”352
Furthermore, both carriers and non-carriers actually showed decreased
distress after testing.353 Similarly, a review of the literature on responses to
genetic testing of cancer susceptibility found that there was very little
evidence of adverse psychological effects observed among people who
learn that they have a genetic predisposition to certain cancers.354
Even when the testing is for a condition like HD (an untreatable and
devastatingly progressive neurological disorder) the evidence suggests that
while carriers experience some short-term distress, long-term psychological
distress is comparable to that of non-carriers.355 Reactions to learning about
risk for other neurodegenerative disorders, such as AD, seem to follow a
similar trajectory.356 One review article examined the health-related quality
349. Id.
350. See id.
351. See, e.g., Bettina Meiser, Psychological Impact of Genetic Testing for Cancer
Susceptibility: An Update of the Literature, 14 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 1060, 1060 (2005) (claiming
that “[m]ost studies on the psychological impact of genetic testing among individuals” without
cancer have revealed no adverse psychological effects among carriers of the cancer-predicting
BRCA1/2 gene who undergo the testing, while non-carriers generally receive a net psychological
benefit from the test).
352. Marita Broadstock et al., Psychological Consequences of Predictive Genetics Testing: A
Systematic Review, 8 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 731, 731 (2008).
353. Id.
354. Meiser, supra note 351.
355. See Bettina Meiser & Stewart Dunn, Psychological Impact of Genetic Testing for
Huntington’s Disease: An Update of the Literature, 69 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY
PSYCHIATRY 574, 576–77 (2000) (finding that in a study of individuals who underwent genetic
testing for Huntington’s disease, the psychological outcomes among carriers and non-carriers
“differed significantly” seven to ten days after the test but measured similarly six to twelve
months after the test). See also Sandi Wiggins et al., The Psychological Consequences of
Predictive Testing for Huntington’s Disease, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401, 1404 (1992) (finding
that both people testing positive for an “increased risk” and those found to have a “decreased risk”
reported the same psychological effects twelve months after the genetic testing); Aad Tibben et
al., Psychological Effects of Presymptomatic DNA Testing for Huntington’s Disease in the Dutch
Program, 56 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 526 (1994).
356. Robert C. Green et al., Disclosure of APOE Genotype for Risk of Alzheimer’s Disease,
361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 245 (2009) (reporting no significant difference in anxiety levels
between those who reviewed their test results and those who did not after being tested for a
genetic predisposition to Alzheimer’s).
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of life for patients after learning about increased risk for a range of
neurodegenerative diseases, finding that 1) severe responses are rare; 2) to
the extent that patients do experience anxiety or depression, it is generally
transient; 3) and most patients do not experience regret.357
The literature tells a similar story about the limited psychological
impact of learning that one is at an increased risk of developing breast
cancer or colon cancer.358 For example, one study demonstrated that while
BRCA mutation carriers reported higher incidence of depression and other
negative psychological effects at one and six months post-test, their
psychological state returned to baseline levels by 12 months.359 A metaanalysis echoed the theme that people are capable of adapting over time,
concluding that the overall literature suggests that there is a brief period of
increased distress after receiving a positive result, but that distress levels
returned to a pre-test baseline over time.360 The literature for hereditary
non-polyposis colon cancer also lends credence to the view that people may
manifest short-term distress but do not generally experience long-term
adverse psychological outcomes as a result of learning about their genetic
risk status.361
One must be careful when evaluating these data, as some of the studies
have methodological limitations. Nevertheless, it is striking that RNTK
proponents continue to make claims about the harmful psychological
impact of genetic information when there is such limited empirical support
for such concerns. More evidence about emotional reactions to genetic
information would certainly be useful, but the existing literature at least
raises important questions about whether we “systematically overestimate
the durability and intensity of the affective impact of events on well-being,”
thereby creating a “culture of risk-aversion in which patients may be opting
out of potentially beneficial diagnostic and treatment regimes.”362

357. Jane S. Paulsen et al., A Review of Quality of Life After Predictive Testing for and Earlier
Identification of Neurodegenerative Diseases, 110 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 1, 2 (2013).
358. Kathryn J. Schlich-Bakker et al., A Literature Review of the Psychological Impact of
Genetic Testing on Breast Cancer Patients, 62 PATIENT EDUC. COUNSELING 13, 13 (2006).
359. Tammy M. Beran et al., The Trajectory of Psychological Impact in BRCA1/2 Genetic
Testing: Does Time Heal?, 36 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 107, 107 (2008).
360. Jada G. Hamilton et al., Emotional Distress Following Genetic Testing for Hereditary
Breast and Ovarian Cancer: A Meta-Analytic Review, 28 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 510 (2009).
361. See Bettina Meiser et al., Psychological Impact of Genetic Testing for Hereditary Nonpolyposis Colorectal Cancer, 66 CLINICAL GENETICS 502, 507 (2004) (finding that carriers tend
to see an increase in negative psychological outcomes through two weeks after testing that returns
to baseline after four to twelve months); see also Polymnia Galiatsatos et al., Psychosocial Impact
of Lynch Syndrome on Affected Individuals and Families, 60 DIGESTIVE DISEASES SCI. 2246,
2246 (2015) (finding that while carriers suffer an increase in depression and anxiety immediately
following testing, these same symptoms “seem to normalize” by six to twelve months).
362. Peters, supra note 342, at 312–13.
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b. Economic harms
If psychological harms are likely to be minimal, that still leaves a
question about economic harms (i.e., discrimination). The likelihood and
magnitude of discrimination is somewhat more difficult to assess, but early
experience with the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (“GINA”)
suggests that perhaps there is less cause for concern than previously
thought. GINA was enacted in 2008, in response to concerns that public
fears about genetic discrimination were inhibiting the adoption of clinical
genetic testing.363 The law prohibited employers and health insurance
companies from receiving genetic information (broadly defined) and from
using genetic information as the basis for employment or actuarial
decisions.364 GINA’s protections only apply when decisions are made on
the basis of genetic risk information; once the disease has become manifest,
GINA no longer applies (although other laws, such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act might provide some protection).365
In the years since its passage, however, there have been remarkably
few cases requiring the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
exercise its enforcement power.366 Since 2010, there have only been an
average of 278 claims filed per year.367 The majority of these claims were
dismissed for lack of reasonable cause, with an annual average of merely 48
cases reaching merit resolution.368 Damages appear to be minimal,
averaging less than $1 million in total awards per year.369 These data
suggest that while there are isolated incidents of genetic discrimination
occurring in the employment and health insurance contexts, there is a
significant gap between the fears that motivated GINA’s passage, and
actual reality. This isn’t to say that genetic discrimination won’t become a
more significant problem in the future. My claim is merely that there is
little evidence of it being a widespread and egregious problem at the
363. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881,
881–83 (in their findings, Congress declared that establishing “a national and unified basic
standard” for preventing genetic discrimination was “necessary to protect the public from
discrimination” and “allay their concern about the potential for discrimination,” so that the
country could better “take advantage of genetic testing, technology, research and new therapies”).
364. See generally id.
365. Mark A. Rothstein, GINA, the ADA, and Genetic Discrimination in Employment, 387 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 837, 839 (2008). See also Anya E.R. Prince & Benjamin E. Berkman, When Does
an Illness Begin: Genetic Discrimination and Disease Manifestation, 40 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 655
(2012).
366. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOY’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GENETIC INFO. NON-DISCRIMINATION
ACT CHARGES FY 2010-2014, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/genetic.cfm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2015) (reporting a total of 1188 resolutions from FY 2010 through FY 2015).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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moment. It is notable that the most highly publicized genetic discrimination
case thus far involved employees being forced to submit to genetic testing
in order to ascertain who was secretly leaving human excrement in their
workplace.370
GINA has been criticized, however, for not covering other areas of
potential genetic discrimination, such as life insurance and long-term care
insurance.371 These areas are difficult to assess in the absence of a GINA
analog. It does appear that there are occasional instances of discrimination
in these realms,372 but that they are primarily associated with untreatable
single gene conditions, like Huntington’s disease,373 that I’ve argued carry
little weight for purposes of determining whether there should be a broad
RNTK.374 Even with some evidence of discrimination in these realms, a
systematic review of existing data calls into question the need for a policy
intervention.375 As one review article concluded, “With the notable
exception of studies on Huntington’s disease, none of the studies reviewed
here (or their combination) brings irrefutable evidence of a systemic
problem of GD that would yield a highly negative societal impact.”376
Again, this isn’t to suggest that genetic discrimination will never become a
problem in life and long-term care insurance. Rather, my argument is that
we should make a clear-eyed assessment of the frequency and magnitude of
any economic harms flowing from disclosure of genetic risk information
before automatically assuming a worst-case scenario. As we will explore in
the next section, there are some potential negative effects associated with
honoring a strong RNTK, which should be balanced against a rigorous
evaluation of the harms associated with not doing so.
3. If we actively solicit patient preferences for knowing or not
knowing, how many people undergoing genomic sequencing
would erroneously or accidentally fail to be notified of
potentially lifesaving information?
On one side of the scale, we have a very small group of people, who
are arguably at very low risk of experiencing significant, lasting

370. Gina Kolata, ‘Devious Defecator’ Case Tests Genetics Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/health/devious-defecator-case-tests-genetics-law.html.
371. Rothstein, supra note 365, at 837.
372. See Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health Insurers’ Use of Genetic
Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 293, 295, 302
(2000) (noting instances of discrimination relating to life, disability and long-term care insurance).
373. Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A Systematic Review of the
Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 25 (2013).
374. See supra Part III.B.4.
375. Joly et al., supra note 373, at 25, 36.
376. Id. at 36.

62

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 19:1

psychological or economic harm. On the other side, we would want to
know the impact of adopting a robust RNTK policy that involved actively
soliciting individual preferences. My argument is that such a policy would
necessarily result in some loss of opportunity to provide people with
valuable information because there is good reason to doubt our ability to
accurately and reliably assess people’s true preferences.
Any attempt to assess individual preferences will likely take place as
part of the informed consent process. A typical model might look like this:
Patients or research participants are given a written informed consent
document that explains the risks and benefits of genomic sequencing, and
includes discussion about the possibility of generating incidental findings.
Perhaps after a conversation with the researcher or clinician (or perhaps
not), the individual would be asked to indicate whether or not they are
interested in learning about genetic risks unrelated to the condition under
investigation. The choice might be binary (“Yes, I want to learning
incidental findings” or “No, I don’t want to learn incidental findings”) or
could present a menu of types of genetic findings any of which could be
selected (e.g., serious/actionable, serious/non-actionable, late-onset, carrier
status, etc.).
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical about our ability to
reliably assess an individual’s true preferences about knowing or not
knowing genetic information. The first problem has to do with how people
engage with informed consent documents. There are extensive data
suggesting that people frequently do not carefully read consent forms, and
when they do, that their understanding and appreciation of the content can
often be lacking.377 These problems are acute enough that the research
ethics community is continually trying to find ways to improve the process
of obtaining informed consent.378
The research demonstrating these effects has been extensive; one
review article that employed quantitative methods to examine whether
research subjects actually comprehended the information contained in a
consent form found that only forty-seven of 427 published medical studies
met specific criteria for comprehensibility, demonstrating that

377. See Henry W. Riecken & Ruth Ravich, Informed Consent to Biomedical Research in
Veterans Administration Hospitals, 248 JAMA 344, 346 (1982) (pointing to data indicating that
“most of the consent forms are written in language that requires reading ability at the college
level” and only “27% of the patients [in the study] had more than a high school education”).
378. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jerry Menikoff, Reforming the Regulations Governing
Research with Human Subjects, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1145, 1147 (2011) (proposing to simplify
consent documents so that they are more understandable).
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comprehension varied widely and was often quite minimal.379 For example,
one specific study showed that more than 25% of the participants had no
idea about the purpose of the research, and only 10% could describe its
goals completely.380 Other studies similarly demonstrated that a substantial
proportion of subjects could not name study risks/side effects without
prompting, and often did not understand basic research characteristics such
as randomization and use of placebos.381 In one study of patients enrolled
in cancer clinical trials, 74% did not recognize that they would be receiving
non-standard treatment, 63% did not understand that they were at potential
risk for increased harm from participation, 70% did not comprehend the
experimental nature of the treatment, 29% did not internalize the fact that
they might not receive any clinical benefits, and 25% did not appreciate that
research trials are done mainly to benefit future patients.382
If subjects are signing consent forms with such incomplete
understanding of the important details contained therein, it seems
questionable to have confidence in the infallibility of any process designed
to solicit preferences about knowing genetic incidental findings. This is
particularly true given the inherent complexity of genetic information, and
the associated difficulty patients will have in making a choice in that
context. Many commentators have expressed a concern that the wide range
of types of genomic findings will be overwhelming and could become a
significant barrier to implementing truly informed consent.383 For example,
as Holm and colleagues have argued:
379. Amulya Mandava et al., The Quality of Informed Consent: Mapping the Landscape. A
Review of Empirical Data from Developing and Developed Countries, 38 J. MED. ETHICS 356,
356–57 (2012).
380. Riecken & Ravich, supra note 377, at 345.
381. See, e.g., Mandava et al., supra note 379, at 357, 362 (showing that multiple studies have
found that a small percentage of subjects actually understand the randomization process and the
concept of a placebo); Jan M. Howard & David DeMets, How Informed is Informed Consent? The
BHAT Experience, 2 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 287, 290–92 (1981) (finding that many
subjects did understand basic information about their clinical trial, but overall, informed consent
did not provide a robust and full understanding. For example, 47% of research participants did not
know that they were assigned to treatment or placebo by chance, and only a minority of subjects
were aware of all of the possible side effects); Margriet van Stuijvenberg et al., Informed Consent,
Parental Awareness, and Reasons for Participating in a Randomised Controlled Study, 79
ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 120, 120 (1998) (finding that while 73% of parents were aware
of the major study characteristics, some had difficulty understanding the information provided).
382. Steven Joffe et al., Quality of Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A CrossSectional Survey, 358 LANCET 1772 (2001).
383. See, e.g., Bredenoord et al., supra note 72, at 29 (“Most if not all patients will have
difficulties with making a reasonable selection out of the wide array of possible genetic findings.
The quantity, significance, and ambiguity of the genetic data generated by NGS will make any
reasonable choice beforehand highly complex.”); Knoppers, supra note 43, at 9 (“Unless the time
period and the content of the right not to know are well laid out in the consent process, the
emerging requirements for the return of results in genomics may rapidly become
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To understand the implications of [preventive genome
sequencing], a person will have to be informed about and (at least
to some degree) understand the prevalence of each MAG
[medically actionable gene], the relation between each MAG and
its linked disease, including mode of inheritance and degree of
penetrance, details about the disease, and details about the
possible prevention and treatment options . . . . Thus, if we have
problems informing people adequately about the relevant
probabilities, risks, and benefits relevant to screening for one
disease, how are we going to do this for 10, 20, or (in the future)
many more diseases? And these are diseases that because of their
genetic nature, furthermore, have potential implications not only
for the person but also for his or her relatives. Even with the best
patient support systems in the world we are unlikely to get
anything approaching “informed consent.”384
In the pre-genomic era when targeted genetic testing was the norm,
patients could reasonably absorb the range of information they might
receive; a single gene test typically only revealed information associated
with the relevant condition.385 But when employing genome sequencing, it
is impossible to know what kind of results will be generated, making the
informed consent process that much more difficult.386 Ensuring patient
comprehension and managing expectation becomes increasingly difficult as
the amount of genomic data generated grows.
Furthermore, it will even be difficult to adequately describe the variety
of genomic information categories because of terminological confusion.
Terms like “actionability,” “clinical utility,” and “clinical significance” are
typically used to describe the kinds of findings someone might or might not
desire, but there is a lack of conceptual clarity about exactly what those
unmanageable.”); Bredenoord et al., Disclosure of Individual Genetic Data to Research
Participants: The Debate Reconsidered, 27 TRENDS GENETICS 41–47 (2011); Amy L. McGuire &
Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent In Genomics and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV.
GENOMICS HUM. GENETICS 361 (2010) (arguing that there are unique ethical issues raised by
genetic research, both in the way research is conducted and the level of understanding of the
participants, that make obtaining informed consent more difficult); ACMG BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Points to Consider for Informed Consent for Genome/Exome Sequencing, 15
GENETICS MED. 748 (2013) (arguing that genomic sequencing poses heightened challenges for
obtaining informed consent relative to the process of informed consent for other types of genetic
testing); Ashley N. Tomlinson et al., “Not Tied Up Neatly with a Bow”: Professionals’
Challenging Cases in Informed Consent for Genomic Sequencing, J. GENETICS COUNSELING 1
(2015); Gail E. Henderson, Is Informed Consent Broken?, 342 AM. J. MED. SCI. 267 (2011); Erika
Check Hayden, Informed Consent: A Broken Contract, 486 NATURE 312 (2012).
384. Søren Holm & Thomas Ploug, Patient Choice and Preventive Genomic Sequencing—
More Trouble Upstream, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 24, 25 (2015).
385. Eckstein et al., supra note 40, at 193.
386. See id. at 190, 193–94 (stating that the results of secondary findings are often
“unanticipated” and “unforeseen by either party at the time of consent”).
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terms mean.387 For example, there seem to be at least two different
conceptions of “actionability.”388 The narrow conception focuses on how
the information can impact the individual’s clinical care by informing
therapies or preventative interventions.389 The expanded view is more
broadly patient-centered, including impact on clinical care, as well as
somewhat more nebulous considerations like importance to the person’s life
choices.390 If scholars in the field cannot agree on a unified definition of the
terms used to describe the categories of genetic information presented, how
can we be confident that patients will have a consistent and predictable
understanding of the same?391
There are also concerns about how preferences can shift over time.392
Life events and the passage of time can change one’s views; the answer
given as a single young adult might be different than the one that same
person would give once they are married with children. But unless the
medical world can develop a process for actively re-soliciting preferences
(an unrealistic proposition) there is the very real risk that a binding decision
made at a single point in time could become inconsistent with future
desires.
Informed consent is a cornerstone of bioethics, and with good reason.
In its ideal form, it allows doctors and researchers to demonstrate respect
for persons, and allows competent individuals to make autonomous choices
about their engagement with medicine. The arguments made above should
not be read as a wholesale indictment of informed consent. Rather, my
point is that we should be skeptical about our capacity to adequately and
accurately assess individual preferences about knowing or not knowing
specific categories of genetic information. In particular, I question the
validity of automatically privileging broad, hypothetical checkbox answers
collected during a demonstrably imperfect informed consent process. While
more empirical research would be helpful in determining the full extent of
the problem, there is a very real risk that a policy of actively soliciting
preferences about knowing or not knowing genetic information could result
in people making choices that do not reflect their true values and

387. Id. at 190.
388. Id. at 197.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See, e.g., Kristi D. Graves et al., Public Perceptions of Disease Severity But Not
Actionability Correlate with Interest in Receiving Genomic Results: Nonalignment with Current
Trends in Practice, 18 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 173, 181 (2015).
392. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Botkin, Informed Consent for Genetic Research, in CURRENT
PROTOCOLS IN HUMAN GENETICS (Nicholas Dracopoli et al. eds., 2001).
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preferences, thus erroneously or accidentally not receiving potentially
lifesaving information.393
C. Moral Distress
I’ve argued that patient autonomy is not the only relevant value in this
debate, and that it is important to seek out other possibly relevant
considerations. In the last section, I examined the full range of effects that
honoring or not honoring the RNTK would have on individual patients or
research subjects. Now I turn to an examination of other relevant
considerations, namely those raised by the interests of medical
professionals. The RNTK can place researchers and clinicians in a difficult
position. It is a vexing problem to possess genetic information that one
deems to be clinically important, but to be precluded from disclosing it
because a patient has exercised their RNTK. These medical professionals
are apt to experience what we can colloquially call the “I-can’t-sleep-atnight” problem. More technically, they are experiencing a phenomenon
known as moral distress.394
A concept that originated from the field of nursing, moral distress
refers to the situation where one knows the morally correct course of action,
but is constrained from taking it.395 Unlike a classic ethical dilemma, where
there are two ethically justifiable, but non-optimal choices, moral distress
involves feeling like there is a clearly correct, but unavailable choice to
make.396 In normal clinical care, moral distress can be found in a range of
situations where structural, legal, or institutional barriers prevent someone
from doing what they feel would be right. These barriers can arise out of
“clinical situations, factors internal to the individual professional, and
factors present in unit cultures, the institution, and the larger health care

393. The obvious response to my argument is to suggest that when patients have chosen not to
know, and their doctors find something that they think justifies revisiting that decision, just ask a
second time. But if one truly wants to honor an expressed desire not to know, it seems practically
impossible to ask the person in a way that doesn’t implicitly alert them to the fact that there has
been a significant result. See Dorothy C. Wertz & John C. Fletcher, Privacy and Disclosure in
Medical Genetics Examined in an Ethics of Care, 5 BIOETHICS 212, 221 (1991) (“There is no way
. . . to exercise the choice of not knowing, because in the very process of asking ‘Do you want to
know whether you are at risk’ the geneticist has already made the essence of the information
known.”).
394. Pauline W. Chen, When Doctors and Nurses Can’t Do the Right Thing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/health/05chen.html.
395. ANDREW JAMETON, NURSING PRACTICE: THE ETHICAL ISSUES (1984). See also Elizabeth
G. Epstein & Sarah Delgado, Understanding and Addressing Moral Distress, 15 ONLINE J. ISSUES
NURSING Manuscript 1 (2010).
396. Epstein & Delgado, supra note 395, at 1–2.
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environment.”397 For example, a doctor or nurse might feel moral distress
when an institution has decided to keep a patient on life support, even
though he or she firmly believes that doing so is not in the patient’s best
interest.398 While most commonly discussed in the context of nursing,
moral distress is experienced by a range of medical specialties.399 Medical
geneticists and genetic counselors seem to be at particular risk. One study
of genetic service providers found that 18% were considering leaving
patient care because of distress.400 As the authors of that study noted,
“[b]ecause of the emphasis on patient autonomy and nondirective
counseling, genetic service providers also may experience moral distress
when patients are making morally charged decisions, especially in prenatal
genetic settings.”401
From a professional perspective, the worry is that experiencing moral
distress can have a lasting detrimental effect on medical practitioners,
which some have termed “moral residue.”402 As Epstein and Delgado
explain:
In situations of moral distress, one’s moral values have been
violated due to constraints beyond one’s control. After these
morally distressing situations, the moral wound of having had to
act against one’s values remains. Moral residue is long-lasting
and powerfully integrated into one’s thoughts and views of the
self. It is this aspect of moral distress—the residue that remains—
that can be damaging to the self and one’s career, particularly
when morally distressing episodes repeat over time.403
Given that a patient’s exercise of their RNTK presents a potential risk
to medical professionals, the question then is how much weight we should
give this concern. Stated another way, when is it permissible for a doctor’s
moral interests (i.e., an orientation towards trying to prevent or ameliorate
disease) to trump patient autonomy?

397. Ann B. Hamric, Empirical Research on Moral Distress: Issues, Challenges, and
Opportunities, 24 HEC FORUM 39, 39 (2012).
398. Mary C. Corley, Nurse Moral Distress: A Proposed Theory and Research Agenda, 9
NURSING ETHICS 636, 638–39 (2002).
399. See, e.g., Wendy J. Austin et al., The Balancing Act: Psychiatrists’ Experience of Moral
Distress, 11 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 89, 89 (2007). See also Epstein & Delgado, supra note
395, at 2 (citing to literature documenting moral distress in a range of healthcare professions).
400. Barbara A. Bernhardt et al., Distress and Burnout Among Genetic Service Providers, 11
GENETICS IN MED. 527, 532 (2009).
401. Id. at 527.
402. Epstein & Delgado, supra note 395, at 2, 4.
403. Id. at 4.
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This notion of beneficence trumping autonomy has been a frequent
topic of exploration in the bioethics literature.404 For example, Edmund
Pellegrino has argued that while autonomy is certainly an important
principle, beneficence and autonomy should be complementary.405
Physician autonomy should also be respected, as the physician has a claim
to follow her own “conscience about what is good medicine and what is
morally acceptable as a person.”406 Similarly, others have concluded that
the morality associated with the medical profession sometimes makes it
permissible to violate a patient’s autonomy.407
This isn’t to say that a medical professional’s interests generally, and
moral distress in particular, are sufficiently weighty to carry an argument
against the RNTK. But considered in the overall context of a rigorous
debate about whether or not we should honor an individual’s RNTK
important medical information about him or herself, it certainly seems like
moral distress is at least another relevant consideration in favor of arguing
that it is appropriate to be skeptical about a broad, strong RNTK.
D. Genetic Exceptionalism
It has been popular to argue that genetic information requires special
treatment, such as extra privacy protections, enhanced pre-test education
and a distinct informed consent process.408 This position was supported by
the strongly held notion that there is something different about genetic
information.409 People have an instinct that genetic information is special,
perhaps because genetic information can uniquely shed light on our familial

404. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and
Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH. L. POL’Y 47, 58
(1994) (discussing conflicts that arise out of the potential incompatibility of beneficence and
autonomy).
405. Id. at 47.
406. Id. at 51.
407. Ost, supra note 27, at 310–11 (“Underlying medicine is another, humanistic valueorientation which calls upon the physician to do what he can to help the patient make autonomous
decisions . . . . It is an insight of this sort, I suspect, that leads Beauchamp and Childress to the
conclusion that it is sometimes permissible to violate the patient's autonomy (in the sense of
freedom from external coercion) in order to promote autonomy.”).
408. Michael J. Green & Jeffrey R. Botkin, “Genetic Exceptionalism” in Medicine: Clarifying
the Differences between Genetic and Nongenetic Tests, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 571, 571
(2003).
409. See, e.g., Miguel Ruiz-Canela & J. Ignacio Valle-Mansilla, What Research Participants
Want to Know about Genetic Research Results: The Impact of “Genetic Exceptionalism”, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES. ETHICS 39 (2011) (showing study results in which participants
considered genetic data to be riskier than other types of medical data).
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or ancestral relationships, or maybe because people (erroneously) subscribe
to genetic determinism.410
Beyond popular instincts, scholars have also made a number of more
rigorous attempts to argue about the ways in which genetic information is
unique.411 First, genetic exceptionalists have argued that genetic
information is often predictive, rather than diagnostic, and thus can be used
to predict an individual’s future health in ways that other kinds of nongenetic medical information cannot.412 Genetic exceptionalists have also
focused on the fact that since genetic information is an immutable part of
your identity and cannot be altered, we should be careful to guard against
the psychosocial and economic effects of disclosing genetic risk
information.413 Finally, genetic information has implications for third
parties; any genetic diagnosis or risk information is not just relevant to the
patient, but also to their blood relatives.414
Nevertheless, as the field of medical genetics has evolved, genetic
exceptionalism has been subject to significant criticism.415 As Evans and
Burke have argued:

410. Jim Evans & Wylie Burke, Genetic Exceptionalism: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 10
GENETICS IN MED. 500, 501 (2008).
411. See, e.g., Patricia A. Roche & George J. Annas, Protecting Genetic Privacy, 2 NATURE
REV. GENETICS 392, 393 (2001) (arguing that DNA sequence information is unique because it has
information beyond medical history and current health status such as future conditions and traits
shared with family members); Gail Geller et al., Genetic Testing for Susceptibility to Adult-Onset
Cancer, 277 JAMA 1467, 1468 (1997) (warning that genetic information affects other family
members, our future behavior, and can put a healthy patient in an “at-risk” category); Barbara
Biesecker et al., Genetic Counseling for Families with Inherited Susceptibility to Breast and
Ovarian Cancer, 269 JAMA 1970 (1993) (reporting that it is now possible to identify family
members who carry a gene that predisposes women to breast and ovarian cancer).
412. Green & Botkin, supra note 408, at 572.
413. Id. at 572–73.
414. Id. at 572.
415. See, e.g., Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and Future Diaries: Is Genetic
Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60, 71 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997)
(proposing that genetic exceptionalism is an “overly dramatic view of the significance of genetic
information in our lives”); Soren Holm, There is Nothing Special About Genetic Information, in
GENETIC INFORMATION: ACQUISITION, ACCESS AND CONTROL 97, 102 (Alison K. Thomson &
Ruth Chadwick eds., 1999) (arguing that there is no distinction between genetic information and
other types of health-related data); Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Genetics Privacy and
the Law: An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS 21 (1999) (asserting that genetic
exceptionalism impairs the achievement of public health goals because genetic information is no
different from other health data); Lainie F. Ross, Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift:
Lessons from HIV, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 141 (2001) (advocating that health care policy
should not give rise to a principle of genetic exceptionalism); Jon Beckwith & Joseph S. Alper,
Reconsidering Genetic Antidiscrimination Legislation, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 205 (1998) (urging
the legislature to redraft antidiscrimination laws for genetic medical information in the same
manner as those for non-genetic medical information).
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If our field of medical genetics realizes the bright future, often
predicted for it, genetic and genomic information will
increasingly aid medical decision-making in many clinical arenas.
This promise calls into question—in our view appropriately—a
core assumption of our field: that genetic information is
qualitatively different from other types of medical information
and thus must be treated in a different way.416
Accompanying this sort of view has been an increasingly powerful chorus
of arguments refuting the basic claims of genetic exceptionalists. While
genetic information can often predict distant future health (sometimes with
high accuracy) there are many examples of non-genetic health information
possessing comparable predictive power.417 For example, a test revealing
high blood pressure can predict one’s chance of developing heart
disease.418 Similarly, non-genetic health information can also have a
profound impact on family members, and can cause psychosocial or
economic harm.419
This strong refutation of genetic exceptionalism is relevant in the
RNTK debate. Proponents of the RNTK are effectively arguing that the
return of any genetic information requires explicitly soliciting patient
consent. Since it is standard practice in many clinical situations to disclose
certain kinds of non-genomic medical findings without asking for explicit
permission, it seems fair to ask whether this instance of genetic
exceptionalism is warranted.
Autonomy is obviously an important value in medical ethics; modern
social norms have clearly and enthusiastically moved away from medicine’s
paternalistic history. However, it isn’t true that patients are asked to make
decisions about every single aspect of their health care. If a patient
undergoes a specifically indicated scan (e.g., to check on the healing of a
broken bone), but that scan incidentally reveals a potentially cancerous
tumor, a doctor isn’t going to ask the patient if they want to learn about the
unexpected but important result. Similarly, if a patient receives a routine
blood panel to check for a specific indication (e.g., monitoring
hypertension) but the panel returns a panic value indicating a serious acute
416. Evans & Burke, supra note 410, at 501.
417. See, e.g., Green & Botkin, supra note 408, at 572; Ross, supra note 415, at 143.
418. Green & Botkin, supra note 408, at 572.
419. See, e.g., id. at 572–73. See also GENETIC TESTING COMM. TO THE MEDICAL SECTION OF
THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN
RISK CLASSIFICATION 45, 45–46 (1989) (arguing that insurance underwriters routinely rely on
information such as HIV status, serum cholesterol levels, alcohol or narcotic addiction, and even
blood pressure to determine eligibility and rates for life or disability insurance); Angelo A. Alonzo
& Nancy R. Reynolds, Stigma, HIV and AIDS: An Exploration and Elaboration of a Stigma
Trajectory, 41 SOC. SCI. MED. 303, 312 (1995) (demonstrating that patients with AIDS and
leprosy have been stigmatized).
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problem (e.g., impending renal failure) the physician isn’t going to ask
before disclosing this urgent finding.
These analogies aren’t perfect;420 genomic findings generally aren’t
associated with conditions that require immediate attention, nor is genetic
predisposition always equivalent to a diagnosis of manifested disease.421
But the question isn’t whether genetic information is precisely analogous to
the urgent cases presented above. Rather, the relevant question should be
whether and why the kind of important genomic information being
discussed here warrants special treatment. Given the thorough rejection of
genetic exceptionalism, the burden of proof lies with RNTK proponents to
make that case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The currently prevailing view about the RNTK involves an almost
exclusive focus on the principle of autonomy. This pure autonomy view
results in an environment where individual preferences must be actively
sought and respected. At the other end of the spectrum, one can imagine an
argument that completely relies on beneficence, justifying forced provision
of genetic information whenever it could provide medical benefit to a given
individual. In between, there seems to be a more centrist, qualified
disclosure view. Embracing “libertarian paternalism,”422 we could give
patients a choice not to receive genetic information (even if that decision
seems objectively unreasonable) but could also create a default package of
recommended variants to disclose. This would function as a form of soft
paternalism, helping to frame decision-making in a way that is thought to
lead to more beneficial choices.
I reject the pure autonomy view for the reasons explored throughout
this article. First, the philosophical basis for such a position seems shaky—
susceptible to a range of at least plausible, if not convincing, challenges.423
Second, a legal analysis cannot support the claim that psychological
integrity clearly deserves the same kind of protection afforded to bodily
integrity.424 Third, there is reason to think people’s instincts about the
RNTK will shift away from a pure autonomy view as genomic medicine
420. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Solomon, Incidentalomas in Genomics and Radiology, 370 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 988, 989 (2014) (explaining that the radiology analogy is flawed because after an
incidental problem is discovered in that context, physicians can efficiently reach a diagnosis).
421. Id. at 990.
422. Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2003) (offering “libertarian paternalism” as acceptable to those who
advocate freedom of choice on the grounds of welfare).
423. Supra Part III.
424. Supra Part IV.
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becomes increasingly incorporated into everyday medical care.425 Fourth,
there is a strong argument to make that a pure autonomy view could do
more harm than good.426 Finally, if we widen the debate beyond a focus on
autonomy, there are other considerations, such as moral distress and genetic
exceptionalism that, while not dispositive on their own, weigh in favor of a
more limited view of the RNTK.427
I cannot, however, endorse a pure beneficence view either. It seems
too paternalistic to force information on someone who is actively resisting
that knowledge. Libertarian paternalism is attractive, but partially fails
because of concerns about our ability to accurately assess individual
preferences for such a complex question. My view falls somewhere
between the liberal paternalism and pure beneficence views. For high
impact genetic information, I think that it is a mistake to actively solicit
preferences. We should inform patients that there is a default set of high
impact incidental findings that will be sought and returned. In the rare case
that someone independently requests to not learn about this information, indepth counseling should be provided to ensure that they fully understand
the choice being made, but ultimately the decision should be honored if not
knowing consistently remains their clearly stated preference. For high
impact genetic information, any deviation from regular disclosure should be
a clearly defined exception, rather than the basis for a broadly applied
conception of the RNTK.
This approach should be relatively uncontroversial for the vast
majority of people since most autonomous adults would want to know lifesaving information. There are, however, a few predictable exceptions that
should be anticipated and accommodated, namely, terminally ill patients,
elderly individuals, and people with religious objections to treatment. These
are all cases where clinical action would likely not be indicated, so it might
be appropriate for medical providers to actively solicit preferences. These
kinds of cases represent an important exception to my proposed approach,
but I do not believe that we should institute a strong RNTK policy based on
a small group that is relatively easy to bracket. The RNTK has become an
ingrained part of our lexicon, and though I ultimately believe that we should
abandon the term altogether, I recognize that this is unlikely. At the very
least, a compelling case can be made that we should at least stop talking
about the RNTK in such strong terms.

425. Supra Part V.A.
426. Supra Part V.B.
427. Supra Part V.C and V.D.

